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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that the government had the power to compel individuals to
reveal a vast amount of personal information about themselves—where
they live, their phone numbers, their physical description, their photograph, their age, their medical problems, all of their legal transgressions
throughout their lifetimes whether serious crimes or minor infractions,
the names of their parents, children, and spouses, their political party affiliations, where they work and what they do, the property that they own
and its value, and sometimes even their psychotherapists’ notes, doctors’
records, and financial information.
Then imagine that the government routinely poured this information
into the public domain—by posting it on the Internet where it could be
accessed from all over the world, by giving it away to any individual or
company that asked for it, or even by providing entire databases of personal information upon request. In an increasingly “wired” society, with
technology such as sophisticated computers to store, transfer, search, and
sort through all this information, imagine the way that the information
could be combined or used to obtain even more personal information.
Imagine the ease with which this information could fall into the
hands of crafty criminals, identity thieves, stalkers, and others who could
use the information to threaten or intimidate individuals. Imagine also
that this information would be available to those who make important decisions about an individual’s life and career—such as whether the individual will get a loan or a job. Also imagine that in many cases, the individual might not be able to explain any concerns raised by this
information or even know that such information was used in making
these decisions.
Imagine as well that this information would be traded among hundreds of private-sector companies that would combine it with a host of
other information such as one’s hobbies, purchases, magazines, organizations, credit history, and so on. This expanded profile would then be sold
back to the government in order to investigate and monitor individuals
more efficiently.
Stop imagining. What I described is what is currently beginning to
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occur throughout the United States by the use of federal, state, and local
public records, and the threat posed to privacy by public records is rapidly becoming worse.
For decades, federal, state, and local governments have been keeping records about their citizens. States maintain records spanning an individual’s life from birth to death, including records of births, marriages,
divorces, professional licenses, voting information, worker’s compensation, personnel files (for public employees), property ownership, arrests,
victims of crime, criminal and civil court proceedings, and scores of
other information. Federal agencies maintain records pertaining to immigration, bankruptcy, social security, military personnel, and so on.
These records contain personal information including a person’s physical
description (age, photograph, height, weight, eye color); race, nationality,
and gender; family life (children, marital history, divorces, and even intimate details about one’s marital relationship); residence, location, and
contact information (address, telephone number, value and type of property owned, description of one’s home); political activity (political party
affiliation, contributions to political groups, frequency of voting); financial condition (bankruptcies, financial information, salary, debts); employment (place of employment, job position, salary, sick leave); criminal history (arrests, convictions, traffic citations); health and medical
condition (doctors’ reports, psychiatrists’ notes, drug prescriptions, diseases and other disorders); and identifying information (mother’s maiden
name, Social Security number). This list is far from complete. Many of
these records are open for public inspection.
Until recently, public records were difficult to access. For a long
time, public records were only available locally. Finding information
about a person often involved a treasure hunt around the country to a series of local offices to dig up records. But with the Internet revolution,
public records can be easily obtained and searched from anywhere. Once
scattered about the country, now public records are consolidated by private sector entities into gigantic databases. Recently, the federal court
system has proposed to make court records available electronically,
sparking a considerable debate over privacy because highly sensitive information such as one’s Social Security number, medical and psychological records, financial information, and even details about one’s marital relationship are sometimes lodged in court records.
A complicated web of state and federal regulation governs the accessibility of these records. This regulation was formulated to balance
two important, yet sometimes conflicting, interests. One of these interests is transparency, the need to expose government bureaucracy to public scrutiny. The Federal Freedom of Information Act is an attempt to
promote such transparency. Access to court records, in the words of Jus-
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tice Holmes, ensures “that those who administer justice should always act
under the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be
able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public
duty is performed.”1
The other interest is privacy. Increasingly, as more personal information is collected, stored, and consolidated in government databases,
the threat to privacy is imminent. Federal, state, and local governments
have been one of the principal suppliers of personal information to the
private sector. A growing number of large corporations are assembling
dossiers on practically every individual by combining information in
public records with information collected in the private sector such as
one’s purchases, spending habits, magazine subscriptions, web surfing
activity, and credit history. Increasingly, these dossiers of fortified public record information are sold back to government agencies for use in
investigating people.
In this Article, I argue that the regulation of public records in the
United States must be rethought in light of the new technologies in the
Information Age, and I advance a theory about how to reconcile the tension between transparency and privacy.
First, I contend that information privacy must be reconceptualized in
the context of public records to abandon the longstanding notion that
there is no claim to privacy when information appears in a public record.
This view, which I term the “secrecy paradigm,” understands privacy as
depending upon whether information is secret or non-secret. The secrecy
paradigm fails to account for the realities of the Information Age, where
information is rarely completely confidential. I suggest that privacy must
be understood as an expectation of a limit on the degree of accessibility
of information.
Second, I critique the widespread view that one has a privacy interest only in information that is embarrassing or harmful to one’s reputation. Much of the personal information contained in public records (i.e.,
one’s race, marital status, party affiliation, property values, and so on) is
relatively innocuous. However, as I explain, it is the totality of the information, aggregated together, that presents the problem. Consolidating
various bits of information, each in itself relatively unrevealing, can, in
the aggregate, begin to paint a portrait of a person’s life. I refer to this as
a “digital biography.” A growing number of private sector organizations
are using public records to construct digital biographies on millions of
individuals. I argue that we should be concerned about the ways in
which our digital biographies are being used. These uses are resulting in
a growing dehumanization, powerlessness, and vulnerability for indi1. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884).
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viduals. Therefore, viewed in light of my theory of information privacy,
the regulation of public record regimes must be substantially rethought.
I contend that the appropriate balance between transparency and
privacy can be reached by limiting access and uses of certain information
rather then making public records unavailable to the public. If the secrecy paradigm is abandoned and privacy is understood as an expectation
in the limitation of the degree of accessibility of information, then commercial access and use restrictions as well as a federal baseline of regulation for all public records would help significantly in addressing the
problem.
A potential hurdle to the adoption of these solutions is the First
Amendment. Although the First Amendment establishes a right to access
certain court proceedings and records, I contend that this right does not
and should not extend to other types of public records. In fact, based
upon developing strands of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Constitution imposes certain limitations and responsibilities on the government’s
collection and use of personal information.
Next, I analyze the implications of such a solution for the First
Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech and the press. This issue
is quite complicated, as there is a significant tension between two lines of
Supreme Court jurisprudence. One line of cases holds that when the
government makes information publicly available in a public record, the
press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it.2 Another line of cases,
however, establishes that the government may selectively grant access to
public record information and suggests that the government may condition the receipt of such information on nondisclosure.3 In an extensive
navigation of these potentially conflicting precedents, I conclude that access and use restrictions of public record information will generally not
run afoul of the First Amendment.
Part I of this Article provides an introduction to the history of public
records and how these records are regulated. Part II describes how privacy in this context should be reconceptualized, taking into account the
problems of access and aggregation. Part III examines the constitutional
issues.
I. THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC RECORDS
From the beginning of the twentieth century, we have witnessed a
2. See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn
Publ’g Co., 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
3. See, e.g., Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S.
32 (1999); cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (finding that prohibiting abortion
counseling or referral as a condition for receipt of Title X funds does not violate the First
Amendment).
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vast proliferation in the number of government records kept about individuals as well as a significant increase in public access to these records.
These trends together have created a problematic state of affairs—a system where the government extracts personal information from the populace and places it in the public domain, where it is hoarded by private
sector corporations that assemble dossiers on almost every American
citizen. In this Part, I will explore public record systems, examining the
types of public records maintained by governments and the regulatory
regime that governs access to these records. This regulatory regime has
not adequately matured to respond to the realities of modern information
flow.
A. AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC RECORD-KEEPING
1. Federal, State, and Local Public Records
Public record-keeping is largely a product of the twentieth century.
Before the mid-nineteenth century, few public records were collected,
and most of them were kept at a very local level.4 During the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, state and local governments
increasingly began to keep records of their citizens.5 In the 1940s, 50s,
and 60s, the expansion of the bureaucratic network of regulation, licensing, and entitlements at the federal, state, and local levels resulted in a
massive escalation of public records.6
Today, a welter of public records is kept by federal, state, and local
governmental entities. States maintain a smorgasbord of public records,
covering one’s life from birth to death.7 Birth records can contain one’s
name, date of birth, place of birth, full names and ages of one’s parents,
and mother’s maiden name.8 In particular, a person’s mother’s maiden
name is an important piece of information because many financial institutions and other entities use it as a password to access more sensitive
data. Shortly after birth, the federal government stamps an individual
4. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB
FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 12 (2000).

SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY

5. Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1892, 1906-07 (1981).
6. See DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: MONITORING EVERYDAY LIFE 73
(Tim May ed., 2001); ALAN F. WESTIN & MICHAEL A. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE
SOCIETY: COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING AND PRIVACY 220-23 (1972). For a discussion
of the expansion of government entitlements and licensing, see Charles A. Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733-37 (1964).
7. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors
for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1403 (2001).
8. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 102425(a)(1)-(11) (West Supp.
2002).
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with a Social Security number, which will be used throughout her life to
identify her and consolidate records about her.9 States also maintain
other records relating to one’s personal life, such as records about one’s
marriage, divorce, and death. These records are often referred to collectively as “vital records.” Records of marriages, which are public in most
states,10 contain maiden name, the date and place of birth of both
spouses, as well as their residential addresses.11
Beyond vital records, states keep records for almost every occasion
an individual comes into contact with the state bureaucracy. When a person obtains a license to drive, the state records and publicizes information such as her name, address, phone number, Social Security number,
medical information, height, weight, gender, eye color, photograph, and
date of birth.12 Additionally, accident reports and traffic citation records
are made publicly available by many states.
Individuals who register to vote must surrender information into a
public record. Voting records can reveal one’s political party affiliation,
date of birth, place of birth, e-mail address, home address, telephone
number,13 and sometimes one’s Social Security number.14 In many
states, this information is publicly available.15
One’s profession and employment often generate a number of records. A number of professions require state licensing, such as doctors,
lawyers, engineers, insurance agents, nurses, police, accountants, and
teachers.16 If an individual is injured at work, worker’s compensation
records may disclose one’s date of birth, type of injury, and Social Security number.17 If a person is a public employee, many personal details
9.
10.
11.
12.

See Solove, supra note 7, at 1402.
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103150 (West 1996).
See, e.g., id. § 103175 (West Supp. 2002).
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
CONCERNING THE AVAILABILITY OF CONSUMER IDENTIFYING INFORMATION AND
FINANCIAL
FRAUD
6
n.5
(March
1997),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/privacy.pdf; see also Joan Biskupic, High Court to Hear Driver Privacy Case, WASH. POST, May 18, 1999, at A8.
13. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 2102, 2150(a)(1)-(10) (West Supp. 2002); CAROLE A.
LANE, NAKED IN CYBERSPACE: HOW TO FIND PERSONAL INFORMATION ONLINE 274
(1997).
14. EDMUND J. PANKAU, CHECK IT OUT! 16 (1998).
15. Some states are beginning to restrict access to voter records for certain purposes,
although the permissible purposes remain quite broad. In California, for example, voter
records are openly available to any political candidate, to any committee for or against any
initiative or referendum, and “to any person for election, scholarly, journalistic, or political
purposes.” CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2194 (West Supp. 2002). Therefore, any person or entity
with even a tangential relationship to the political process can obtain this information.
16. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1403.
17. See LANE, supra note 13, at 275. Seven states make workers’ compensation records publicly accessible. See PUBLIC RECORDS ONLINE: THE NATIONAL GUIDE TO
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are released to the public by way of personnel records, including one’s
home address, phone number, Social Security number, salary, sick leave,
and sometimes even e-mail messages.18 In Massachusetts, government
officials are required by law to maintain “street lists” containing the
names, addresses, dates of birth, veteran statuses, nationalities, and occupations of all residents.19 These lists, which organize residents by the
streets they live on, are made available to the police,20 to all political
committees and candidates, and to businesses and other organizations.21
One’s home and property are also a matter of public record. Property tax assessment records contain a detailed description of one’s home,
including number of bedrooms and bathrooms, amenities such as swimming pools, the size of the house, and the value.22 These records are
public.23 Other property ownership records unveil lifestyle information
such as whether one owns a boat, and if so, its size and type.24
Often, any contact with law enforcement officials will yield a record. Arrest records can contain one’s name, occupation, physical description, date of birth, and the asserted factual circumstances surrounding the arrest.25 Police records also contain information about victims of
crime.
Court records are potentially the most revealing records about individuals. Whenever a person comes into contact with the judicial system,
information is released into a public record. In almost all states, court
records are presumed to be public.26 Although current practice and existPRIVATE & GOVERNMENT ONLINE SOURCES OF PUBLIC RECORDS 21 (Michael L. Sankey
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2001).
18. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-4(b)(8)(A)-(C) (Michie 2001) (first version)
(requiring disclosure of particular information in public employees’ personnel records including salary, education, prior work experience, and any disciplinary troubles); Braun v.
City of Taft, 201 Cal. Rptr. 654, 660-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (permitting disclosure of an
employee’s Social Security number, home address, and birth date); Eskaton Monterey
Hosp. v. Myers, 184 Cal. Rptr. 840, 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (permitting disclosure of a
state employee’s personnel file, which contained education and training experience); Moak
v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 336 A.2d 920, 921, 924 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (permitting
disclosure of payroll records that contained employees’ names, gender, date of birth, annual salary, and other personal data). But see IDAHO CODE § 9-340C(1) (Michie Supp.
2001) (exempting personnel records from public disclosure).
19. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 51, § 4 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001)
20. Id.
21. Id. § 6; see also Pottle v. Sch Comm. of Braintree, 482 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Mass.
1985).
22. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 408.3 (West 1998).
23. See id. § 408.3(a) (“Property characteristics information maintained by the assessor is a public record and shall be open to public inspection.”).
24. See LANE, supra note 13, at 274-75.
25. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(f)(1) (West Supp. 2002).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 114-17; see, e.g., CAL. R. 243.1(c) (“Unless
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ing physical constraints limit the extent to which personal information in
court documents can be accessed, new technologies are on the verge of
changing this reality.27
In civil cases, such as suits for personal injury, medical malpractice,
product liability, and so on, court files may contain vast quantities of
data, such as medical history, mental health data, tax returns, and other
financial information.28 For example, in an ordinary civil lawsuit over an
automobile accident, the plaintiff must submit medical information, including any pre-existing conditions that might affect her recovery or be
responsible for her symptoms. This data could even include psychological information. To establish damages, the plaintiff must also reveal details about her lifestyle, activities, and employment. If this information is
contained in a document filed with the court or is mentioned in a hearing
or at trial, it can potentially become accessible to the public unless protected by a protective order. In addition to plaintiffs, civil defendants
must also yield personal information in many instances.
Witnesses and other third parties who are involved in cases can have
deeply personal details snared by discovery and later exposed in court
documents. If a person serves as a juror, her name, address, spouse’s
name, occupation, place of employment, and answers to voir dire questions may become part of the court record.29 Additionally, some courts
have held that the public may have access to questionnaires given to jurors as part of voir dire.30 Voir dire questions can involve sensitive matters such as whether a juror was the victim of a crime, the juror’s political
and religious beliefs, any medical and psychological conditions that
confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open.”). Not all court
records are public; in most states, adoption records, grand jury records, and juvenile criminal court records are not public. See, e.g., David S. Jackson, Privacy and Ohio’s Public
Records Act, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 107, 120 (1997); see also The Federal Judiciary, Frequently Asked Questions, Filing a Case, Q: How Can I Check on the Status of My Case?
Can I Review Case Files?, at http:/www.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last visited June 29, 2002).
Beyond pleadings and motions (which are, for the most part, always contained in the court
file), other documents (such as exhibits) and transcripts may or may not be contained in
the file. For example, typically a trial transcript will only be contained in the court file if
an appeal is taken. The availability of other documents, such as exhibits, in the court file
is controlled by local practice. Local practices vary greatly depending on limited storage
capacities in clerks’ offices. Often, exhibits are kept by the parties.
27. See infra Part I.A.3.
28. LANE, supra note 13, at 246.
29. See, e.g., Unabom Trial Media Coalition v. United States Dist. Court, 183 F.3d
949, 950 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1358-59 (3d Cir. 1994)
(noting that a public right of access to voir dire proceedings exists); People v. Mitchell,
592 N.W.2d 798 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the press has a “qualified right of
access” to jurors’ names and addresses).
30. Lesher Communications, Inc. v. Superior Court, 274 Cal. Rptr. 154, 156-57 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990).
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might affect the juror’s performance, and other private details.31
Beyond ordinary civil lawsuits, special civil proceedings such as
appeals from the denial of social security benefits release much information into court records, such as a person’s disability, work performance,
Social Security number, birth date, address, phone number, and medical
records.32 In federal bankruptcy courts, any “paper filed . . . and the
dockets of a bankruptcy court are public records and open to examination
by an entity at reasonable times without charge.”33 Information involved
in bankruptcy proceedings includes one’s Social Security number, account numbers, employment data, sources of income, expenses, debts
owed, and other financial information.34 Additionally, in certain circumstances, employees of a company that declares bankruptcy can have their
personal information divulged in public bankruptcy records.35
In some states, family court proceedings are public. For example, a
divorce proceeding can unmask the intimacies of marital relationships.
As one state court held, “[a] private citizen seeking a divorce in this State
must unavoidably do so in a public forum, and consequently many private family and marital matters become public.”36
For criminal cases, there is even less privacy. Beyond the personal
details about a defendant released at trial or in the government’s indictment or charging papers, conviction records are made public.37 Information about victims—their lifestyles, medical data, and occupation—can
also be found in court records. Presentence reports prepared by probation officers about convicted defendants facing sentence are used by
judges in arriving at the appropriate sentence. These reports contain
identifying information about the defendant, a summary of the defen-

31. In practice, juror information is rarely sought out except in high profile cases.
32. A person may appeal from the denial of social security benefits pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), amended by Act of Dec. 21, 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-90, 115 Stat. 878. If social security information is disclosed in court filings, confidentiality is lost. 20 C.F.R. § 401.180 (2001).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (2000).
34. Mary Jo Obee & William C. Plouffe, Jr., Privacy in the Federal Bankruptcy
Courts, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1011, 1020 (2000).
35. See Jerry Markon, Curbs Debated As Court Records Go Public on Net, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 27, 2001, at B1. Normally, bankruptcy filings only include personal information about a company’s top officials. However, an Internet furniture retailer included information in its bankruptcy petition about all employees “to blunt criticism from creditors
that it had recklessly burned through cash.” Id. At the request of creditors, a courtappointed trustee posted the information on the retailer’s website. Id.
36. In re Keene Sentinel, 612 A.2d 911, 915-16 (N.H. 1992); see also Barron v. Fla.
Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113, 119 (Fla. 1988) (“[P]arties seeking a dissolution of their marriage are not entitled to a private court proceeding just because they are
required to utilize the judicial system.”).
37. See LANE, supra note 13, at 213.
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dant’s prior criminal conduct, social history, character, family environment, education, employment and income, and medical and psychological information.38 Although in many states and in federal court, presentence reports remain confidential, in some states, such as California, the
presentence report becomes part of the court file after sentencing.39
Community notification laws for sex offenders, often referred to as
“Megan’s Laws,” require the maintenance of databases of information
about prior sex offenders and disclosure of their identities and where they
live.40 In 1996, Congress passed a federal Megan’s Law restricting states
from receiving federal anti-crime funds unless they agree to “release
relevant information that is necessary to protect the public” from released
sex offenders.41 As a result, all fifty states enacted some version of Megan’s Law.42 Sex offender records often contain the sex offender’s Social Security number, photograph, address, prior convictions, and places
of employment.43 Some states have placed their sex offender records on
the Internet.44 Several states fail to identify the particular crime the offenders are charged with, lumping all of them under the label sex offender, even where some might be rapists while others could be listed for
sodomy, public masturbation, or indecent exposure.45
In a move broader than Megan’s Law, some localities are widely
disseminating records about individuals arrested, but not yet convicted,
of certain crimes. For example, in 1997 Kansas City initiated “John TV,”
broadcasting on a government-owned television station the names, photographs, addresses, and ages of people who had merely been arrested
(not convicted) for soliciting prostitutes.46 Other cities have initiated
38. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.10 (West 1982); CAL. CT. R. 4.411.5(a)(6).
39. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203d (West Supp. 2002) (“The report shall be
filed with the clerk of the court as a record in the case at the time the court considers the
report.”).
40. See Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that New Jersey’s Megan’s Law does not violate the constitutional right to information privacy because
of compelling governmental interest in preventing sex offenses); Russell v. Gregoire, 124
F.3d 1079, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that Washington’s Megan’s Law does not
violate the constitutional right to information privacy because the information compiled
and disclosed is already public).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), amended by Act of Oct. 28,
2000, 42 U.S.C.S. § 14071 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001).
42. Jane A. Small, Who Are the People In Your Neighborhood? Due Process, Public
Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1451, 1459 (1999).
43. See, e.g. Paul P., 170 F.3d at 398; Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082.
44. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Law Enforcement, Sexual Offenders/Predators Search
System, at http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Sexual_Predators (last visited March 12, 2002) ;
N.C. State Bureau of Investigation, North Carolina Sex Offender & Public Protection Registry, at http://sbi.jus.state.nc.us/sor/ MainText.htm (1998).
45. See Small, supra note 42, at 1456, 1463-64.
46. Edward Walsh, Kansas City Tunes In as New Program Aims at Sex Trade: ‘John
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similar programs.47 Additionally, a growing number of states are furnishing online databases of all of their current inmates and parolees.48
2. The Government-Madison Avenue Connection
For a long time, private sector companies have relied upon public
records to obtain personal information about individuals for marketing
purposes. In the burgeoning Information Age, marketing thrives upon
personal information, giving rise to an entire industry devoted to the collection of personal information. I have discussed the history and current
collection and use of personal information by the private sector in more
detail elsewhere.49
Much of the information collected by the private sector comes from
public records and personal information held by the government. For example, beginning in the nineteenth century, advertisers began using census data as a marketing device.50 In 1970, the United States began selling its census data on magnetic tapes.51 Often at the behest of marketers,
the Census Bureau increasingly sought data about people’s lifestyles. To
do this, the Census Bureau required a subset of households to fill out a
long questionnaire asking dozens of questions.52 These questions included such information as how much rent people pay, what products
they own, their occupation, their marital history, and their income.53 The
connection between the Census Bureau and marketers has been a very
close one. Presidents have frequently appointed former marketers to
serve as the head of the Census Bureau.54 In 1981, a group of ten companies made a pact with the Census Bureau for it to undertake a special
TV,’ WASH. POST, July 8, 1997, at A3.
47. Id.
48. D. Ian Hopper, Database, Protection, Or a Kind of Prison?: Web Registries of
Inmates, Parolees Prompt a Debate, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2000, at A31.
49. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1403-09.
50. ERIK LARSON, THE NAKED CONSUMER: HOW OUR PRIVATE LIVES BECOME
PUBLIC COMMODITIES 30-31 (1992).
51. See DICK SHAVER, THE NEXT STEP IN DATABASE MARKETING 29 (1996); see
also LARSON, supra note 50, at 41.
52. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. HUGHES, THE COMPLETE DATABASE MARKETER 270 (2d
ed. 1996); ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 127 (1971).
53. See MILLER, supra note 52, at 127. The 2000 Census long form asks for information on sex, age, race, education, employment, income, value and physical description
of residence, vehicles owned, as well as other information. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2000
Long
Form
Questionnaire
(Form
D-2)
available
at
www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/do2p.pdf (approved for use by the public through Dec.
31, 2000).
54. Since the 1970s, the Census Bureau has been run by a former director of marketing at General Motors, an executive at a political polling firm, a research manager for
Sears, and a past president of the American Marketing Association. LARSON, supra note
50, at 44.
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tabulation of census data by zip code—with the companies enjoying exclusive access to the results.55 The questions asked by the census are often quite helpful to marketers and the Census Bureau has been accused of
being too influenced by the needs and wants of corporate America.56
For decades, many states have been selling their public records to
the highest bidder.57 Colorado used to sell its motor vehicle information
for about $4.4 million a year.58 Florida offered to sell copies of its motor
vehicle information for $33 million.59 New York earned $17 million in
one year from such sales.60 In 1994, the Federal Government, alarmed at
this practice, passed the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, restricting such
disclosures of information from motor vehicle records.61
Increasingly, there is a two-way information flow between the private and public sectors. In other words, not only is the government supplying information to the private sector, but the private sector is assisting
the government in generating information about individuals. Currently,
government agencies such as the FBI and IRS are purchasing public record collections aggregated by private sector companies and combined
with other data gathered by the private companies.62 A private company
called ChoicePoint, Inc. has amassed a database of ten billion records and
has contracts with at least thirty-five federal agencies to share the data
with them.63 In 2000, the Justice Department signed an $8 million contract with ChoicePoint, and the IRS reached a deal with the company for
between $8 and $12 million.64 ChoicePoint collects information from
public records from around the country and then combines it with information from private detectives, the media, and credit reporting firms.65
This data is indexed by people’s Social Security numbers.66 The Health
Care Financing Administration (now the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services) uses ChoicePoint’s data to help it identify fraudulent
55. Id. at 44-45.
56. Id. at 44-46.
57. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Governments Find Information Pays, WASH. POST,
Mar. 9, 1998, at A1.
58. Robert Kowalski, Privacy Bills Up Next: Should Sale of Driver’s License Info
Continue?, DENVER POST, May 5, 1997, at 1A.
59. Larry Rohter, Florida Weighs Fees for its Computer Data: Some See Profits;
Others, Too High a Price, N.Y. TIMES NAT’L, Mar. 31, 1994, at B9.
60. See Biskupic, supra note 12, at A8. Wisconsin receives $8 million annually from
the sale of motor vehicle data. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998).
61. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2000).
62. See Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get The Goods
on You, It May Ask ChoicePoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at A1.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Medicare claims by checking health care provider addresses against
ChoicePoint’s list of “high-risk and fraudulent business addresses.”67
ChoicePoint claims that it has records on almost everybody with a credit
card.68
ChoicePoint’s information is not only used by government agencies
but also by private sector employers to screen new hires or investigate
existing employees.69 The information in ChoicePoint’s collection is a
mixture of fact and fiction.70 There are a number of errors in the records.71 Richard Smith of the Privacy Foundation obtained his report
and discovered numerous errors, including the false facts that he had
been previously married and that his wife had a son three years before
they met.72 A ChoicePoint report also erroneously indicated that a
woman was a convicted drug dealer and shoplifter, resulting in the termination of her employment.73 ChoicePoint also had a hand in the 2000
Presidential Election problems in Florida. ChoicePoint supplied Florida
officials with a list of 8000 “ex-felons” to eliminate from their voter
lists.74 However, many of the 8000 were not guilty of felonies, only
misdemeanors, and were legally eligible to vote.75 Although the error
was discovered prior to the election and officials tried to place the individuals back on the voter rolls, the error might have led to some eligible
voters being turned away at the polls.76
3. The Impact of Technology
For a long time, public records have been accessible only in the
various localities in which they were kept. A person or entity desiring to
find out about the value of an individual’s home would have to travel to
the town or county where the property was located and search through
the records at the local courthouse. Depending upon local practice, the
seeker of a record might be able to obtain a copy through the mail. Court
records, such as bankruptcy records, would typically be obtained by visiting a courthouse or engaging in a lengthy correspondence with the
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Richard Smith, My FBI File, at http://www.privacyfoundation.org/ commentary/tipsheet.asp (May 11, 2001).
73. See Simpson, supra note 62, at A1.
74. See Gregory Palast, Florida’s Flawed “Voter-Cleansing” Program, Salon.com,
at http://www.salonmag.com/politics/feature/2000/12/04/voter_file/ index.html (Dec. 4,
2000).
75. Id.
76. See id.
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clerk’s office.77 The seeker of a record could not obtain records en
masse; records could only be obtained for specific individuals.
This reality, however, is rapidly changing. As records are increasingly computerized, entire record systems rather than individual records
can be easily searched, copied, and transferred. Private sector organizations sweep up millions of records from record systems throughout the
country and consolidate those records into gigantic record systems.
Many websites now compile public records from across the country.78
There are more than 165 companies offering public record information
over the Internet.79 These companies have constructed gigantic databases
of public records that were once dispersed throughout different agencies,
offices, and courthouses, and with the click of a mouse, millions of records can be scoured for details.80
The increasing digitization of documents and the use of electronic
filing will soon result in much greater accessibility to court records online. A recent proposal to make court records electronic and available
over the Internet has garnered significant attention. A majority of courts
post only court rulings and schedules on their websites. Only a handful
of courts now post complaints and other legal documents.81 A few states
have begun to require electronic copies of records to be filed or to convert existing records into electronic format. For example, in New Jersey,
bankruptcy records (including a debtor’s bankruptcy petition) are
scanned into electronic format and can be accessed through the Internet.82 Some companies are beginning to make digital images of records
available over the Internet.83
Recently, the federal court system announced plans to develop a
system for placing court filings online. The existing system, called
PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records), includes only basic
docketing information such as the names of the parties, attorneys, general
type of action, and a list of documents filed. The system under develop77. See Obee & Plouffe, supra note 34, at 1012.
78. See Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in
the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1156-57 (1997).
79. See PUBLIC RECORDS ONLINE, supra note 17, at 8.
80. For example, KnowX.com states that it has amassed millions of public records,
which are updated regularly. See http://www.knowx.com (last visited June 29, 2002).
Search Systems contains over 6000 searchable public record databases. See
http://www.pac-info.com (last visited June 29, 2002). Locateme.com permits its users to
search public records such as driver registrations, voter registrations, and credit headers.
See http://www.locateme.com (last visited June 29, 2002).
81. See Joanna Glasner, Courts Face Privacy Conundrum, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 26,
2001, at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,41967,00.html.
82. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Dist. of N.J., Case Information, at
http://www.njb.uscourts.gov/caseinfo/ (last visited March 12, 2002).
83. See http://www.courthousedirect.com (last visited June 29, 2002).
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ment, called Case Management/Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”), is
designed to be in place by 2005.84 The system will make full case files
accessible via the Internet.85 Currently, nine courts use the CM/ECF system.86 Anybody is permitted to view, print, and download any document
filed in the system. The courts, however, have not developed comprehensive policies to deal with privacy concerns.87
Beyond greater accessibility, technology may also lead to the retention of greater amounts of personal information in public records. Under
current practice, due to storage space constraints, clerks’ offices often do
not maintain copies of exhibits and other documents related to trials.
However, as court documents such as pleadings and exhibits are filed in
digital format, they will become easier to store. Further, under current
practice, transcripts are typically produced only when a case is appealed.
New technology enables transcripts of court proceedings to be made instantaneously without having to be transcribed. The increased use of
such technology could result in the existence of more transcripts of trials,
which can potentially include personal information about many parties
and witnesses.
In sum, the increasing digitization of documents enables more
documents to be retained by eliminating storage constraints, increases the
ability to access and copy documents, and permits the transfer of documents en masse. Personal information in public records, once protected
by the practical difficulties of gaining access to the records, is increasingly less obscure.
B. THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC RECORDS
As it currently stands, public records law is a complicated and diverse hodge-podge of various statutes, court practices, and common law
rights that vary from state to state and leave much personal information
unprotected. Our information regulatory infrastructure is disconnected,
often outdated, and inadequate to meet the challenges of the new technologies of the Information Age. This section provides a brief overview
of the law that governs public records.

84. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, News Release, at
http://privacy.uscourts.gov/Press.htm (Feb. 16, 2001).
85. See Brian Krebs, Public Hearing Over Online Court Documents Planned,
NEWSBYTES, Feb. 20, 2001, at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/ 01/162183.html.
86. See Office of Judges Programs of the Admin. Office of the United States Courts,
Privacy and Access to Electronic Case Files in the Federal Courts at 6, at
http://www.uscourts.gov/privacyn.htm (Dec. 15, 1999).
87. Id.
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1. The Common Law, Court Records, and Protective Orders
At common law, English courts rarely encountered cases involving
an individual seeking to gain access to government documents.88 In certain limited circumstances, English courts recognized that the public
could inspect certain government records.89 If an individual were denied
the ability to inspect, she could seek to enforce her right through mandamus; however, there were severe restrictions on the ability to use mandamus to obtain access to records. Individuals could not bring mandamus on their own and had no right to access government documents for
their own personal purposes.90 There was a narrow exception to this
rule, however, when the seeker of a record needed to obtain it for use in
litigation. Courts would generally “not issue the extraordinary writ of
mandamus to enforce a private right of inspection, unless the purpose
was to use it in some pending or prospective suit.”91 In contrast, access
to court records, as opposed to other public records, was broader. When
documents were introduced into evidence, individuals were permitted access.92
Early U.S. courts followed the English practice.93 In many jurisdictions, an individual seeking to inspect non-court records for the general
public interest (to expose graft or corruption, or to bring government activities into the sunlight), could not bring suit in her own name; only the
Attorney General could bring an action on her behalf.94 However, if the
person had a “special interest” in examining the records (for example, to
provide evidence in a legal proceeding), the individual could bring a petition for mandamus on her own.95 As one court articulated the rule in
1882,
The individual demanding access to, and inspection of public writings must not
only have an interest in the matters to which they relate, a direct, tangible interest, but the inspection must be sought for some specific and legitimate purpose.96
88. See HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW 25 (1953).
89. See, e.g., Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749, 750-51 (Mich. 1928). See generally
William Ollie Key, Jr., The Common Law Right to Inspect and Copy Judicial Records: In
Camera or On Camera, 16 GA. L. REV. 659 (1982).
90. Nowack, 219 N.W. at 750-51.
91. Id. at 751.
92. See CROSS, supra note 88, at 135; Key, supra note 89, at 666.
93. See CROSS, supra note 88, at 26.
94. Nowack, 219 N.W. at 751.
95. See id. at 751; CROSS, supra note 88, at 25-26; Comment, Public Inspection of
State and Municipal Documents: “Everybody, Practically Everything, Anytime, Except . . . .”, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1105, 1108 (1977).
96. Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299, 305 (1882). Some jurisdictions, such as Michigan and Rhode Island, recognized a broader right to access than the English rule early on.
See Burton v. Tuite, 44 N.W. 282, 285 (Mich. 1889); In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (R.I.
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In several jurisdictions, the common law evolved to abandon the
view that access to documents was limited only to litigation purposes.97
The “interest” required for inspection was expanded to include the interest in redressing public wrongs and monitoring government functions.98
Under the modern common law rule in many jurisdictions, a person can
inspect public records when the purpose is not improper and access is not
harmful to others.99 One of the most commonly mentioned improper purposes for accessing public records was “to satisfy idle curiosity or for the
purpose of creating a public scandal.”100 Therefore, government officials
could deny access to information based on the person’s reason for seeking the information.101 Today, however, this discretion has been significantly reduced by state and federal freedom of information laws.
In contrast to public records, the right to inspect court records was
generally broader and was shaped by the supervisory authority of the
courts.102 The courts had a long tradition of permitting open access to
court records, and access was rarely limited based on the purposes for
which the records were sought.103
In 1978, in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,104 the Supreme
Court took notice of the right to inspect and copy both public records and
court records: “It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including
judicial records and documents.”105 The Nixon Court noted that “[i]n
1893).
97. See CROSS, supra note 88, at 26.
98. See id. at 27; Public Inspection, supra note 95, at 1108.
99. See CROSS, supra note 88, at 29. As one court explained, “We cannot find any
valid basis in our society for the imposition of the requirement of the interest stated in the
common-law rule as a prerequisite to the right to inspect public records.” City of St. Matthews v. Voice of St. Matthews, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974).
100. Voice of St. Matthews, 519 S.W.2d at 815; Husband, C. v. Wife, C., 320 A.2d
717, 723 (Del. 1974) (characterizing the common law approach as permitting access to
judicial records if a person “has an interest therein for some useful purpose and not for
mere curiosity”).
101. See, e.g., Mans v. Lebanon Sch. Bd., 290 A.2d 866, 867 (N.H. 1972); see also
Matthew D. Bunker et al., Access to Government-Held Information in the Computer Age:
Applying Legal Doctrine to Emerging Technology, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 543, 556
(1993) (“Most states depended on the discretion of agencies, or on the common law, to
provide public access to government records until they were inspired by the federal FOIA
to codify the concept of open government. The common law had varied among states,
with most courts requiring a person requesting a record to have a legitimate interest in, and
a useful purpose for, the requested record.”).
102. See Key, supra note 89, at 668 (“Consistent with state court decisions, federal
courts historically allowed, absent sensitive circumstances, anyone to inspect and copy
judicial records for any purpose.”).
103. See CROSS, supra note 88, at 135-36.
104. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
105. Id. at 597.
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contrast to the English practice, American decisions generally do not
condition enforcement of this right on a proprietary interest in the document or upon a need for it as evidence in a lawsuit.”106 The Court explained that the right to access public records is justified by “the citizen’s
desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies, and in a
newspaper publisher’s intention to publish information concerning the
operation of government.”107
The right of access to court records differs from the right to access
other public records. As the Nixon Court noted, the common law right of
access applies to court records; however, the right is not absolute.108 The
Court observed that “[e]very court has supervisory power over its own
records and files, and access has been denied where court files might
have become a vehicle for improper purposes.”109 The Court noted that
public access has been denied where records would have been used to
promote scandal by revealing embarrassing personal information, to
serve as “reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption,” or to
harm a litigant’s business.110 The decision over whether to permit access
“is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to
be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.”111 Thus, the common law protects privacy in the context of
court records by giving judges discretion over access to their records and
proceedings.112
In the federal court system, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), judges have discretion “for good cause shown” to issue protective orders to shield information from disclosure where it might cause
a party “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”113 Rule 26(c) was part of the original version of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure adopted in 1938.114 The Federal Rules explicitly provided for protective orders because the Rules significantly expanded pretrial discovery to encompass almost all information that could

106. Id. (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 598 (citations omitted).
108. Id.; see also United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Nixon for the proposition that right of access is not absolute); United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d. 1044, 1047-50 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying a balancing test to determine if public access is proper).
109. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 599.
112. Judicial discretion over access is, of course, constrained by the First Amendment.
See infra Part III.A.
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
114. Id.
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be of help in the preparation of the case.115 This broad expansion created
a new threat to privacy, as the Rules did not differentiate between private
and non-private information. To protect privacy, as well as other interests such as trade secrets, Rule 26(c) was designed to limit the use of discoverable information beyond the context of the litigation.116 Most states
have modeled their discovery provisions, including protective orders, on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.117
Federal courts have held that there is a presumption in favor of access to court records.118 When seeking a protective order, the party seeking to maintain the confidentiality of a record has the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of access.119 Courts balance a party’s
interest in privacy against the public interest in disclosure.120 If a court
decides to deny access, it “must set forth substantial reasons.”121
Generally, documents disclosed to parties in discovery but not filed
in court are not subject to the common law right of access.122 According
to the Supreme Court in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,123 “pretrial
depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial.
Such proceedings were not open to the public at common law, and, in
general, they are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice.”124
Courts retain discretion to issue special orders to keep certain proceedings and information confidential. A court will sometimes, under
very limited circumstances, seal court proceedings such as trials.125
Courts can seal court records if the parties’ desire for confidentiality
outweighs the need for public access.126 A trial court can permit a plain115. See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to
the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 447 (1991).
116. Id.
117. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 29 (1984).
118. See, e.g., United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Pansy
v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 782 (3rd Cir. 1994); SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe,
990 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1993); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir.
1986).
119. FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408-10 (1st Cir. 1987).
120. See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 413 (6th Cir. 1986).
122. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 33.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. See, e.g., Unabom Trial Media Coalition v. United States Dist. Court for E. Dist.
of Cal., 183 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 1999). The court must find that those excluded have
“a reasonable opportunity to state their objections” and the court must make the following
specific factual findings: that “(1) closure serves a compelling interest; (2) there is a substantial probability that, in the absence of closure, this compelling interest would be
harmed; and (3) there are no alternatives to closure that would adequately protect the compelling interest.” Id.
126. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994); CAL. CT.
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tiff to proceed anonymously with the use of a pseudonym.127 Courts can
also permit anonymous juries when jurors might otherwise be placed in
danger.128 These decisions, however, are within the discretion of the trial
court,129 and courts differ greatly in the exercise of their discretion. For
example, one court permitted a woman raped at a train station who sued
Amtrak to keep her identity secret because of the potential embarrassment she would suffer if the fact she was raped became widely disclosed.130 In contrast, another court held that a victim of sexual assault
could not sue her assailant for civil damages under a pseudonym because
“[f]airness requires that she be prepared to stand behind her charges publicly” and because she was “seeking to vindicate primarily her own interests.”131
In sum, under modern American common law, there is a limited
right to access public records so long as one’s purpose is not improper.
For court records, the common law right to access follows the supervisory authority of the courts, and judges have significant discretion in
granting or denying access.132
2. Freedom of Information Laws
State legislatures gradually replaced or supplemented the courtcreated right of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with open
records statutes, which generally mandated open access.133 These statutes
are often entitled or referred to as “freedom of information,” “open acR. 243.1(d)(1)-(5) (providing that a court may seal records if there is an “overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record” and the sealing is “narrowly
tailored” and “[n]o less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest”).
127. See, e.g., Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Doe v. Bell Atl.
Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 418, 420 (D. Mass. 1995); see also James v. Jacobson, 6
F.3d 233, 238-42 (4th Cir. 1993); Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 322-24 (11th Cir. 1992).
The use of pseudonyms is rare and reserved only for exceptional cases. “It is the exceptional case in which a plaintiff may proceed under a fictitious name.” Id. at 323.
128. Reporters Comm. for the Freedom of the Press, Court Access: The Privacy Paradox, at http://www.rcfp.org/pp_pt3.html (last visited June 29, 2002).
129. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786.
130. See Doe v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. CIU.A. 94-5064, 1997 WL 116979,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 1997).
131. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. at 361; see also Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., 162 F.R.D. at 422
(D. Mass. 1995) (rejecting use of pseudonym for plaintiff alleging a sexual assault by her
supervisor at work and that she might have been infected with HIV).
132. See, e.g., United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811-15 (10th Cir. 1997).
133. See Roger A. Nowadzky, A Comparative Analysis of Public Records Statutes, 28
URB. LAW. 65, 69-70 (1996); Jason Lawrence Cagle, Note, Protecting Privacy on the
Front Page: Why Restrictions on Commercial Use of Law Enforcement Records Violate
the First Amendment, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1422 n.2 (1999). While some states’
FOIAs replaced the common law, courts in some states have held that the state’s FOIA
operates as an additional right of access to the common law. See id.
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cess,” “right to know,” or “sunshine” laws. States were initially slow in
enacting statutory public access rights; by 1940, only twelve states had
open records statutes.134
In 1946, the federal Administrative Procedures Act (APA) contained
a limited provision for disclosure of government records.135 However,
under § 3 of the APA, information could be withheld if it involved “any
function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public interest” or
was “required for good cause to be held confidential.”136
In 1966, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
dramatically reforming public access to government records. According
to the Senate Report for FOIA, the APA was “full of loopholes which allow agencies to deny legitimate information to the public” and that information was often “withheld only to cover up embarrassing mistakes or
irregularities.”137 When he signed the FOIA into law, President Lyndon
Johnson declared,
This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: A democracy
works best when the people have all the information that the security of the Nation permits. No one should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around decisions
which can be revealed without injury to the public interest.138

As Fred Cate observes, the FOIA serves three purposes: “first and
most important, ensure public access to the information necessary to
evaluate the conduct of government officials; second, ensure public access to information concerning public policy; and third, protect against
secret laws, rules and decisionmaking.”139
Under FOIA, “any person” (including associations, organizations,
and foreign citizens) may request “records” maintained by an executive
agency.140 FOIA does not apply to records kept by Congress or the Judiciary.141 Requesters of records do not need to state a reason for requesting records.142
134. See Public Inspection, supra note 95, at 1107.
135. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946).
136. Id., superceded by the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). For a
discussion of the ineffectiveness of the APA, see Bunker et al., supra note 101, at 552-53.
137. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965). The House Report likewise noted that under § 3
of the APA, “[g]overnment agencies whose mistakes cannot bear public scrutiny have
found ‘good cause’ for secrecy.” H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497 (1966), reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2423.
138. 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B.
JOHNSON 699 (1967), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 8 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3451.
139. Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy and the Public’s Right to Know: The
“Central Purpose” of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 41, 65 (1994).
140. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2000).
141. See id. § 552(f).
142. See, e.g., United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
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Today, all fifty states have open records statutes, a majority of
which are modeled after the FOIA.143 Like the federal FOIA, state
FOIAs are justified by a strong commitment to openness and transparency.144
Many states, following FOIA, eliminated the common law requirement of requesters establishing an interest in obtaining the records.145
Indeed, the federal FOIA and many state FOIAs allow information to be
obtained by anybody for any reason.146 Most state FOIAs contain a presumption in favor of disclosure.147
Open access laws never mandate absolute disclosure. They contain
exemptions, typically (although not always) including an exemption to
protect individual privacy. The federal FOIA contains nine enumerated
exemptions to disclosure, two of which pertain to privacy. Exemption 6
exempts from disclosure “personnel and medical files and similar files
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy.”148 Exemption 7(C) exempts from disclosure “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . [which]
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.149 If possible, private information can be deleted from
records, and the redacted records disclosed to the requester.150
The federal FOIA does not require that a person be given notice that

Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989).
143. Jackson, supra note 26, at 111; Nowadzky, supra note 133, at 65-66.
144. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10001 (1997) (stating that “it is vital that
citizens have easy access to public records in order that the society remain free and democratic”); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 140/1 (1) (West 1993) (stating that the right to inspect
public records “is necessary to enable the people to fulfill their duties of discussing public
issues fully and freely”); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.2(1) (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
132-6(a) (1999); Mans v. Lebanon Sch. Bd., 290 A.2d 866, 867 (N.H. 1972).
145. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6(b) (1999).
146. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 771 (stating that the federal FOIA provides the
same access rights to the general public as it does to those asserting a particular interest in
a document); Nowadzky, supra note 133, at 78 (noting that many state FOIAs eliminated
the requirement of demonstrating need or stating purpose); see also IOWA CODE ANN. §
22.2(1) (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6(b) (1999) (“No person . . . shall be required to
disclose the purpose or motive for the request.”); State Employees Ass’n v. Dep’t of
Mgmt. and Budget, 404 N.W.2d 606, 616 (Mich. 1987) (holding that Michigan’s FOIA
does not require a person to justify her request for access); Mans, 290 A.2d at 867 (describing the elimination of common law discrimination based on the purpose of the record
seeker in New Hampshire’s Right to Know Law).
147. Nowadzky, supra note 133, at 66 & n.6 (conducting a comprehensive survey of
all state FOIAs as to the presumption of disclosure).
148. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000).
149. Id. § 552(b)(7)(C).
150. See id. § 552(b).
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his or her personal information is encompassed within a FOIA request.151
Even if an individual finds out about the request, she has no right under
FOIA to prevent or second-guess an agency’s decision to disclose the records. FOIA does not require that the government withhold information.152 It is up to the government agency to assert and to litigate the individual’s privacy interest.153
State FOIA privacy exemptions come in myriad shapes and sizes.
Many state sunshine laws contain a privacy exemption similar to that
found in the FOIA,154 applying when disclosure would constitute a
“clearly unwarranted” invasion of privacy.”155 However, not all state
FOIAs have a privacy exemption. Pennsylvania’s Right to Know Act156
does not contain a privacy exemption; it prohibits only access to records
“which would operate to the prejudice or impairment of a person’s reputation or personal security.”157 As one court stated, “the phrase ‘personal
security’ does not mean ‘personal privacy.’”158 Ohio’s Public Records
Act does not contain any privacy exemption.159
The privacy exemptions in state FOIAs have often been expanded or
constricted by judicial interpretation.160 In applying FOIA privacy exemptions, many states go along with the federal FOIA approach and bal151. Heather Harrison, Note, Protecting Personal Information from Unauthorized
Government Disclosures, 22 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 775, 787 (1992).
152. Cate et al., supra note 139, at 49; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation:
Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV.
553, 593 (1995).
153. In contrast, companies seeking to protect trade secrets can initiate actions on their
own to protect their information in what is known as a “reverse-FOIA” lawsuit. See Harrison, supra note 151, at 783.
154. Jackson, supra note 26, at 114.
155. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-534(a)(2) (Lexis 2001) (applying a privacy exception where disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.243(1)(a) (1994) (stating that the privacy exception applies “where the public disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of an individual’s privacy”).
156. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 66.1-66.4 (2000).
157. Id. § 66.1(2).
158. Kanzelmeyer v. Eger, 329 A.2d 307, 310 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).
159. See 1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 2001) (listing exceptions to disclosure); see also State ex rel. Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v. Cleveland, 661
N.E.2d 187, 193-95 (Ohio 1996) (Resnick, J., concurring) (criticizing the lack of a privacy
exception in Ohio’s Public Records Act).
160. For example, in In re Rosier, 717 P.2d 1353, 1358 (Wash. 1986), the court expanded the scope of the personal privacy exception under Washington’s Public Disclosure
Act to encompass anything that is connected to an individual or that reveals something
“unique” about an individual. A number of states have held that certain forms of public
record information (such as names and addresses) are not “private” because they do not
involve intimate or embarrassing details. See supra notes 155, 159 and accompanying
text.
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ance interests of privacy against the interests of public access.161 However, states have adopted widely differing approaches often stemming
from vastly different judicial conceptions of privacy.
It is critical to note that the federal FOIA was passed before the rise
of computer databases. In 1996, due to the development of modern computer technology, Congress passed the Electronic Freedom of Information Amendments (E-FOIA)162 which amended the FOIA to enable any
person to access electronic documents (including e-mail messages) in the
same way he or she could access paper documents.163 Agencies must establish an index to the documents they possess and make the index available on the Internet.164 Further, agencies must establish “electronic reading rooms” where people can read documents online.165 The electronic
reading room must contain documents that are likely to be requested multiple times.166 As states computerize their records, these computer databases are often encompassed within the broad definition of “public reSome states explicitly include
cords” in many state FOIAs.167
computerized information in their definitions of public records.168
3. Privacy Acts
The federal Privacy Act was borne out of fears of computerized databases. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, social commentators began
to voice privacy concerns about computerized databases.169 People
feared the eventual creation of a national database using the Social Security number as the primary identifier.170 Throughout the mid-1960s and
1970s, Congress devoted a significant amount of attention to the prob-

161. Nowadzky, supra note 133, at 79. At least one state has rejected such an approach, opting to apply the exception by determining solely whether such information is
private (but adopting a rather narrow conception of privacy). See State Employees Ass’n
v. Dep’t of Mgmt. & Budget, 404 N.W.2d 606, 611-13 (Mich. 1987).
162. Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(2) (2000)).
163. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2000).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Nowadzky, supra note 133, at 70.
168. Id. at 70, 75 & n.16.
169. See, e.g., MYRON BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 14 (1964); MILLER, supra
note 52; NOMOS XII: PRIVACY (J. Ronald Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds., 1971); ALAN F.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); WESTIN & BAKER, supra note 6, at 3-5; Kenneth L. Karst, “The Files”: Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored
Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342, 359-63 (1966). See generally Symposium, Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REV. 211 (1968).
170. See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 95 (1995).
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lem.171 In 1973, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) issued a profoundly influential report about computer databases,
condemning the trend toward making the Social Security number a universal identifier.172 The report noted a growing public “distrust” with
computer record-keeping systems173 and no “coherent or conceptually
unified approach to balancing the interests of society and the organizations that compile and use records against the interests of individuals who
are the subjects of records.”174 The report recommended that a code of
Fair Information Practices should be enacted:
There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence
is secret.
There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him
is in a record and how it is used.
There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes
without his consent.
There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable information about him.
Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended
use and must take reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the data.175

In 1974, after years of apprehension over computer databases, Congress finally passed the Privacy Act.176 The Privacy Act, embodying the
Fair Information Practices, gives individuals the right to access and correct
information about themselves held by federal agencies and restricts federal
agencies’ collection, use, and disclosure of personal information. According to the Act, “No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in
a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to
another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior
written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains . . . .”177
Agencies can only maintain information about individuals that is “relevant
and necessary” to accomplish a particular purpose of the agency.178 When
collecting personal information, agencies must inform individuals about
the purposes for which the information is to be used, and the effects on the

171. Id. at 71-74.
172. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND
THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 108-35 (1973) [hereinafter HEW 1973 REPORT].
173. See id. at 28.
174. Id. at 35.
175. Id. at 41-42.
176. See REGAN, supra note 170, at 8.
177. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2000).
178. Id. § 552a(e)(1).
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individual for not providing any of the requested data.179 Agencies must
ensure “security and confidentiality of records.”180 Further, individuals
can review their records upon request181 and ask an agency to correct inaccurate data.182 The Privacy Act authorizes individuals to bring civil actions if agencies do not correct an individual’s record, fail to give an individual access to her record, maintain a shoddy record that results in an
adverse determination against an individual, or fail to comply with any
provision of the Privacy Act that results in an adverse effect on an individual.183
Additionally, the Privacy Act gives citizens certain rights regarding
the use of their Social Security numbers. Unlike the rest of the Privacy
Act, which applies only to federal agencies, § 7 of the Privacy Act
makes it “unlawful for any Federal, State or local government agency to
deny any individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such individual’s refusal to disclose his social security account
number.”184
The Privacy Act, however, failed to bring the growing uses of Social
Security numbers under control. The use of the Social Security number
continued to escalate after the Privacy Act.185 The reason for this failure
arose in part because the Privacy Act’s Social Security number provisions are limited only to the public sector.186 As a result, Social Security
numbers are frequently collected by private sector entities, and it is currently legal for these entities to sell or disclose Social Security numbers.
Further, Congress frequently made exceptions to the Act to expand the
uses of SSNs.187
In addition to the problems with its regulation of Social Security
numbers, the Privacy Act has other significant limitations. The Privacy
179. Id. § 552a(e)(3).
180. Id. § 552a(e)(10).
181. Id. § 552a(d)(1).
182. Id. § 552a(d)(2).
183. Id. § 552a(g)(1).
184. Id. § 552a note.
185. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON
SOC. SEC., COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: SOCIAL
SECURITY: GOV’T AND COMMERCIAL USE OF THE SOC. SEC. NUMBER IS WIDESPREAD 4,
7-12 (1999).
186. See id. at 78; see also Use and Misuse of Social Security Numbers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong.
(2000) (testimony of Marc Rotenberg, director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center) (urging new legislation to protect widespread uses of Social Security numbers).
187. PHILIPPA STRUM, PRIVACY 50-51 (1998); Flavio L. Komuves, We’ve Got Your
Number: An Overview of Legislation and Decisions to Control the Use of Social Security
Numbers as Personal Identifiers, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 529, 569
(1998).
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Act is limited only to the public sector.188 The Act applies only to federal, not state and local agencies. Further, the Act has been eroded by
about a dozen exceptions.189 For example, agencies can disclose information without the consent of individuals to the Census Bureau, to law enforcement entities, to Congress, and to consumer reporting agencies.190
When FOIA requires that information be released, the Privacy Act does
not apply.191 Nor does the Privacy Act apply to court records.192
The broadest exception is that information may be disclosed for any
“routine use” if disclosure is “compatible” with the purpose for which the
agency collected the information.193 The “routine use” exception has repeatedly been criticized as being a gigantic loophole.194 For example, in
1977, the federal government began matching its computer employee records with the records of people receiving federal benefits to detect
fraud.195 Records in different government benefit programs were also
compared.196 Through this automated investigatory technique, the government investigated millions of people quickly, efficiently, and secretly.
This sharing of records between different government agencies, ordinarily a violation of the Privacy Act, was justified under the “routine use”
exception.197 In 1988, Congress finally passed a law regulating this practice,198 but the law has been strongly criticized as providing scant sub188. Although privacy advocates in Congress wanted the Act to extend to the private
sector, President Ford threatened to veto the law if it extended beyond public records.
Sandra L. Macklin, Students’ Rights in Indiana: Wrongful Distribution of Student Records
and Potential Remedies, 74 IND. L.J. 1321, 1325 (1999).
189. See STRUM, supra note 187, at 50-51.
190. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)-(12) (2000).
191. See id. § 552a(t)(2); Martin v. Office of Special Counsel, Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
819 F.2d 1181, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
192. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(B), 552(f); see also United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d
992,1013 (3d Cir. 1988); Warth v. Dep’t of Justice, 595 F.2d 521, 522-23 (9th Cir. 1979).
193. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(b)(3).
194. See Schwartz, supra note 152, at 585-87 (describing criticism of the “routine use
exemption” and advancing his own criticisms).
195. See REGAN, supra note 170, at 86. As Priscilla Regan has noted, surprisingly,
the Fourth Amendment implications of computer matchings have not been litigated. See
id. at 90.
196. See Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY:
THE NEW LANDSCAPE 198-99 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997).
197. See REGAN, supra note 170, at 87.
198. See Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA) of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a)(8)-(13), (e)(12),
(o)-(r), (u) (2000)). The CMPPA requires agencies to formulate procedural agreements
before exchanging computerized record systems and establishes Data Integrity Boards
within each agency to oversee matching, requires agencies to perform a cost-benefit analysis of proposed matching endeavors, and requires agencies to notify individuals of the termination of benefits due to computer matching and permit them an opportunity to refute
the termination. Id.
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stantive guidance and having little practical effect.199 As Robert Gellman
correctly notes with regard to the “routine use” exception, “[t]his vague
formula has not created much of a substantive barrier to external disclosure of personal information.”200
Although the Privacy Act requires an individual’s permission before
his or her records can be disclosed, redress for violations of the Act is
virtually impossible to obtain.201 The Privacy Act provides individuals
with a monetary remedy for disclosures of personal information only if
the disclosure was made “willfully and intentionally.”202 This restriction
on recovery of damages fails to redress the most common form of mistakes—those due to carelessness. This leaves little incentive to bring
suit.203 For example, in Andrews v. Veterans Administration,204 the Veterans Administration released inadequately redacted personnel records of
nurses resulting in what the court called a “substantial” violation of
nurses’ privacy. However, the agency could not be sued under the Privacy Act because it acted negligently, not willfully.205 Paul Schwartz
aptly notes that “individuals who seek to enforce their rights under the
Privacy Act face numerous statutory hurdles, limited damages, and scant
chance to effect an agency’s overall behavior.”206
Although several states have promulgated statutes protecting privacy in certain narrow contexts, less than a third have enacted a general
privacy law akin to the Privacy Act.207 As Paul Schwartz observes, most

199. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPUTER MATCHING: QUALITY OF
DECISIONS AND SUPPORTING ANALYSES LITTLE AFFECTED BY 1988 ACT 3 (1993)
(“[T]he implementation of these new procedures does not appear to have had major effects
on the most important review process. . . .”); PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R.
REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 101 (1996); Schwartz, supra note 152, at 588 (the
CMPPA “creates no substantive guidelines to determine when matching is acceptable”);
INFO. POL’Y COMM., NAT’L INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, OPTIONS FOR
PROMOTING PRIVACY ON THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: DRAFT FOR
PUBLIC COMMENT 10, at http://www.iitf.doc.gov/ipc/privacy.htm (1997).
200. Gellman, supra note 196, at 198.
201. See id. (pointing out that there is no administrative process in place to challenge
agencies’ disclosures); Harrison, supra note 151, at 787 (noting that “some persons who
may have had their privacy violated by unauthorized agency actions received no remedy
for their injury”); Todd Robert Coles, Comment, Does the Privacy Act of 1974 Protect
Your Right to Privacy? An Examination of the Routine Use Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REV.
957, 975 n.118 (1991) (stating that the “individual’s ability to be made whole” has been
“crippled” under the Privacy Act).
202. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2000).
203. Coles, supra note 201, at 975 n. 118.
204. 838 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1988).
205. Id. at 425.
206. Schwartz, supra note 152, at 596.
207. See id. at 605. For a compilation of state privacy laws, see ROBERT ELLIS SMITH,
COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS 3-66 (1997).
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states lack “omnibus data protection laws” and have “scattered laws
[that] provide only limited protections for personal information in the
public sector.”208
4. Access and Use Restrictions
Confronted with increased information trade, some states have attempted to restrict access to personal information in public records as
well as certain uses of personal information obtained from public records.
In the last decade, a number of states have enacted access restrictions for
some of their public records, often excluding access for the commercial
uses of soliciting business or marketing services or products. For example, Georgia amended its public records law in 1991 making it unlawful
to access law enforcement or motor vehicle accident records “for any
commercial solicitation of such individuals or relatives of such individuals.”209 In 1992, Louisiana restricted access to accident records for commercial solicitation purposes.210 Kentucky, in response to “a public
groundswell [that] developed against the release of accident reports to
attorneys and chiropractors,”211 amended its public records law in 1994
to restrict access for these and other commercial uses.212 In 1996, Florida
restricted the access of driver information in traffic citations from those
seeking it for commercial solicitation purposes.213 Colorado prohibited
access to criminal justice records unless those seeking access signed a
statement that such records would not be used “for the direct solicitation
of business for pecuniary gain.”214 California recently restricted access
to arrest records by providing that the records “shall not be used directly
or indirectly to sell a product or service . . . and the requester shall execute a declaration to that effect under penalty of perjury.”215 Almost half
of the states prohibit the commercial use of voter registration records.216
208. Schwartz, supra note 152, at 605.
209. GA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-9 (Harrison 1998).
210. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:398(H) (West Supp. 2002).
211. Amelkin v. McClure, 168 F.3d 893, 896 (6th Cir. 1999).
212. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.635 (Michie Supp. 2001).
213. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.650(11) (West 2001). The law explicitly noted that it did
not apply to media publication or “when used to inform a person of the availability of
driver safety training.” Id.
214. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-305.5 (2001).
215. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(f)(3) (West Supp. 2002).
216. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Government Finds Information Pays, WASH. POST,
Mar. 9, 1998, at A1. For example, California provides that voter registration lists may
only be released to candidates, political committees, or for “election, scholarly, journalistic, political, or governmental purposes.” CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2194(a)(2) (West Supp.
2002). Florida prohibits the use of lists of registered voters for any use other than uses
“related to elections, political or governmental activities, voter registration, or law enforcement.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 98.095(2) (West Supp. 2002).

2002]

ACCESS AND AGGREGATION

1167

The federal government also has certain access restrictions for its
public records. Pursuant to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),
reports of contributors to political committees are “available for public
inspection . . . except that any information copied from such reports . . .
may not be sold or used by any person for the purpose of soliciting contributions or for commercial purposes.”217
In sum, although in certain contexts laws are beginning to limit access to public records for some purposes, the vast majority of public records remain virtually unrestricted in access.

5. Restrictions on State Information Practices
In a rare instance, the federal government has directly regulated the
states’ use of public records. In 1994, Congress passed the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) to curtail the practice of many states of selling their motor vehicle records to marketers.218 Pursuant to DPPA, “A
State department of motor vehicles . . . shall not knowingly disclose or
otherwise make available to any person or entity personal information
about any individual obtained by the department in connection with a
motor vehicle record . . . .” 219
Originally, DPPA provided that if an individual did not opt out, then
information could be used for any purpose. In 1999, Congress amended
DPPA, changing the opt-out provision to an opt-in requirement, forcing
states to require a driver’s consent before disclosing personal information
to marketers.
In Reno v. Condon,220 the Supreme Court concluded that DPPA was
a proper exercise of Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce:
The motor vehicle information which the States have historically sold is used by
insurers, manufacturers, direct marketers, and others engaged in interstate commerce to contact drivers with customized solicitations. The information is also
used in the stream of interstate commerce by various public and private entities

217. 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) (2000). Although the FEC occasionally uses decoy names
to check to see if candidates are engaging in improper uses of the records, the FEC has not,
according to critics, done much to investigate reports of abuse. See Chandrasekaran, supra note 216, at A1.
218. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
2721-25 (2000)).
219. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (2000) (“Under the amended DPPA, States may not imply
consent from a driver’s failure to take advantage of a state-afforded opportunity to block
disclosure, but must rather obtain a driver’s affirmative consent to disclose . . . personal
information for use in surveys, marketing, solicitations, and other restricted purposes . . . .”).
220. 528 U.S. 141, 144-45 (2000).
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for matters related to interstate motoring.221

The Court correctly recognized that information is an essential aspect of commerce and that it is a matter appropriately within Congress’s
power to regulate. Further, the Court concluded that DPPA does not “require the states in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens”222 because DPPA “regulates the States as the owners of databases”
and does not require them to enact regulation or to assist in enforcing
federal statutes concerning private individuals.223
Although DPPA is an important first step in bringing state public
records systems under control, DPPA applies only to motor vehicle records and does not forbid the dissemination of all the other public records
states maintain.
6. Conclusion: The Regulatory Regime of Public Records
As illustrated above, states vary significantly in what information
they make publicly available. Often such decisions are made by agencies
and bureaucrats or left to the discretion of the courts. Decisions as to the
scope of access—whether one must obtain a record by physically going
to a local agency office, by engaging in correspondence by mail, or by
simply downloading it from the Internet—are often made by local bureaucrats. Frequently, it is up to the individual to take significant steps to
protect privacy, such as overcoming the presumption of access to court
records. In many instances, individuals are never even given notice or an
opportunity to assert a privacy interest when records containing their personal information are disclosed.
Differing protection of personal information with no minimum floor
of protection presents significant problems in today’s age of increasing
mobility and information flow.224 There is no federal law establishing a
baseline for the regulation of public records. Thus, personal information
is regulated by a bewildering assortment of state statutory protections,
which vary widely from state to state. As Paul Schwartz notes, “[s]tate
data protection law in the United States is largely unchartered territory.”225 “Some data protection exists in every state,” he observes, “but
no two states have adopted precisely the same system of regulation.”226
This chaotic state of affairs is troublesome in an Information Age
221. Id. at 148.
222. Id. at 151.
223. Id.
224. See Bruce D. Goldstein, Comment, Confidentiality and Dissemination of Personal Information: An Examination of State Laws Governing Data Protection, 41 EMORY
L.J. 1185, 1205-06 (1992) (critiquing the lack of uniformity in state public records laws).
225. Schwartz, supra note 152, at 604.
226. Id.
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where information so fluidly passes throughout the country and is being
made more widely available by the Internet and through private companies. The privacy protection that currently exists for public records is
largely designed for a world of paper records and has been slow to adapt
to an age where information can be downloaded from the Internet in an
instant.

II. ACCESS AND AGGREGATION: RETHINKING PRIVACY AND
PUBLIC RECORDS
A. THE TENSION BETWEEN TRANSPARENCY AND PRIVACY
A 1998 episode of a television newsmagazine illustrates one way
that the tension between transparency and privacy can arise.227 A man,
imprisoned for murder, obtained under a state FOIA the address of a
former girlfriend.228 When she learned that her ex-boyfriend obtained
her address, the woman became quite scared because her ex-boyfriend
was prone to losing his temper and held a grudge against her.229 She
lived in fear, knowing that someday he would be released and might
come after her.230 The prisoner, however, claimed that he was the father
of her child and needed the address because he wanted to file a paternity
suit.231 This story illustrates why it is important for people to be able to
obtain certain information about others, yet also demonstrates the dangers and threat to privacy caused by the ready availability of information.
There are at least four general functions of transparency: (1) to shed
sunshine on governmental activities and proceedings; (2) to find out information about public officials and candidates for public office; (3) to
facilitate certain social transactions, such as selling property or initiating
lawsuits; and (4) to find out information about other individuals for a variety of purposes. I will discuss each in turn.
First, and perhaps most importantly, transparency provides the public with knowledge about the government and an understanding of how it
functions.232 By promoting awareness of the workings of government,
transparency serves a “watchdog” function. Open access to government
227. Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 30, 1998).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980) (discussing the benefits to the public of conducting open criminal trials).
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proceedings ensures that they are conducted fairly.233 Public access exposes the government to public scrutiny and enables a check on abuse
and corruption.234 “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants,” declared Justice Brandeis, “electric light the most efficient policeman.”235
As courts have observed, making arrest records public provides “valuable
protection against secret arrests and improper police tactics,”236 and preserves “the integrity of the law enforcement and judicial processes”237 by
ensuring that the public can prevent abuse of the government’s power to
arrest individuals.238 Open access to public court records “allows the citizenry to monitor the functioning of our courts, thereby insuring quality,
honesty, and respect for our legal system.”239 As James Madison observed, “A popular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power
which knowledge gives.”240 According to Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes:
It is desirable that the trial of [civil] causes should take place under the public eye not because the controversies of one citizen with another are of public
concern, but because it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should always act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every
citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in
which a public duty is performed.241

Access to court records permits people to examine the information
considered by courts making decisions affecting the public at large. Issues raised in a product liability case could have significance for millions
of others who use a product. Information about how certain types of
cases are resolved—such as domestic abuse cases, medical malpractice
cases, and others—is important for assessing the competency of the judicial system for resolving important social matters. Scholars and the me-

233. Id. at 569.
234. Id.
235. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 92 (1932).
236. Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 606 (1968) (per curiam)
(Warren, C.J., dissenting) (quotations omitted); see also Davis v. North Carolina, 310 F.2d
904, 910 (4th Cir. 1962) (en banc) (Haynsworth, J., dissenting) (recycling on the police
record to examine police tactics); Engrav v. Cragun, 769 P.2d 1224, 1228 (Mont. 1989);
Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. City of Houston, 531 S.W.2d 177, 186 (Tex. App. 1975)
(discussing the legitimate interests for disclosure of police records).
237. United States v. Hickey, 767 F.2d 705, 708 (10th Cir. 1985).
238. United States v. Ross, 259 F. Supp. 388, 390 (D.D.C. 1966).
239. In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984).
240. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
241. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884).
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dia need to look beyond a judicial decision or a jury verdict to scrutinize
records and evidence in a case. The ability to identify jurors enables the
media to question them about the reasons for their verdict. Courts and
commentators have pointed out that the Watergate Scandal might never
have been uncovered if the original bail hearing had been closed to the
press because reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein would not
have been suspicious that expensive attorneys were representing the burglars.242
The second function of transparency is to enable the scrutiny of public officials or candidates for public office. Information about a politician’s criminal history might be informative to many voters. Information
about a politician’s property may provide insight into the politician’s
wealth, a factor that might shape the politician’s values and public decisions. Some voters may find a politician’s divorce records and marital
history illustrative of a politician’s character. Other possibly informative
information about a politician could include that she was sued many
times or sued others many times; that she once declared bankruptcy; that
she never voted in any elections; that she was formerly registered in another political party; that she owns property in other states; and so on.
Open access to public records enables voters to find out such information
to make more informed choices at the polls.
Third, transparency facilitates certain social transactions. Access to
public records is an essential function for the sale and transfer of property, as it enables people to trace ownership and title in land. Public record information is useful in locating witnesses for judicial proceedings
as well as locating heirs to estates. Further, access to public records can
allow individuals and entities to track down individuals they want to sue
and to obtain the necessary information to serve them with process.
The fourth function of transparency is to enable people to find out
information about individuals for various other purposes. Public records
can help verify individual identity, investigate fraud, and locate lost
friends and classmates. Public records enable law enforcement officials
to locate criminals and investigate crimes, and can assist in tracking
down deadbeat parents.243 Public records can permit people to investigate babysitters or child care professionals. Employers can use public
record information to screen potential employees, such as examining the
past driving records of prospective truck drivers or taxicab drivers.
Criminal history information might be relevant when hiring a worker in a

242. United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 n.25 (5th Cir. 1983); G. Michael
Fenner & James L. Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: To Richmond Newspapers and
Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 436 n.109 (1981).
243. See Chandrasekaran, supra note 216.
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child care facility or when hiring a kindergarten teacher.244
Transparency, however, can come into tension with privacy. Can
both of these important values be reconciled? Before turning to this
question, I must first address how the privacy problem that public records
contribute to should be understood. Commentators have long struggled
over defining what privacy is and why it is important, especially in the
context of information collection and use.245 We must rethink certain
longstanding notions about privacy before we can reach an appropriate
balance between transparency and privacy.
B. CONCEPTUALIZING PRIVACY AND PUBLIC RECORDS
1. Access: The Public is Private
One of the longstanding conceptions of privacy is that it involves
secrecy and is lost once information is disclosed. I call this the “secrecy
paradigm.” According to this paradigm, an invasion of privacy consists
of concealed information being unveiled or released in some way to others. Another central form of invasion is being watched or listened to
both surreptitiously or in the open. The harms caused by these invasions
of privacy are self-censorship and reputational damage.246
This paradigm is so embedded in our privacy discourse that privacy
is often represented visually by a roving eye, an open keyhole, or a person peeking through Venetian blinds. Further, this paradigm explains
why the Big Brother metaphor has become so widely used for depicting
privacy problems.247 Much of privacy law has developed around this
paradigm. For example, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has routinely held that there is no expectation of privacy
whenever it is possible that something can be seen or heard from a public
vantage point, even if that perception is through a sensory enhancement
device.248 Accordingly, the Court has held that there is no expectation of
244. I am not contending that all of these purposes are desirable uses of public record
data, especially since many of them constitute significant invasions of an individual’s privacy. However, many people view these purposes as highly beneficial.
245. See, e.g., JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 3 (1992) (“Exploring the concept of privacy resembles exploring an unknown swamp.”); MILLER, supra
note 52, at 25; Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 272, 272 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed.,
1984) (stating that “nobody has a clear idea” of what the right to privacy means); Ruth
Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 422 (1980) (stating that commentators have urged looking past the rhetoric to truly understand privacy law).
246. Solove, supra note 7, at 1394-99.
247. Id. at 1396.
248. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
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privacy when the government uses a sophisticated aerial camera to photograph objects that cannot be seen by the naked eye,249 or when third
parties have access to information.250
Along with this paradigm, privacy is often understood as an exclusive status or domain. Information is categorized as either public or private. When information is private, it is hidden, and as long as it is kept
secret, it remains private. On the other hand, when information is public,
it is in the public domain available for any use, and a person can no
longer claim that the information is private. Understood this way, information has a particular status; it can either be in one domain or another.
The law often treats information in this black-and-white manner; either it
is wholly private or wholly public.
In the Information Age, this paradigm is outmoded, and it could
lead to the practical extinction of privacy. Unless we live as hermits,
there is no way to exist in modern society without leaving information
traces wherever we go. Life today is fueled by information, and it is virtually impossible to live as an Information Age ghost, leaving no trail or
residue. Does this mean that privacy is no longer possible? The answer
to this question is yes only if we adhere to the dichotomous conception of
privacy as a status, with information being in either a secret private realm
or an open public realm.
In order to protect privacy in the Information Age, we must abandon
the secrecy paradigm. Privacy involves an expectation of a certain degree of accessibility of information. Under this alternative view, privacy
entails control over and limitations on certain uses of information, even if
the information is not concealed. Privacy can be violated by altering levels of accessibility, by taking obscure facts and making them widely accessible. Our expectation of limits on the degree of accessibility emerges
from the fact that information in public records has remained relatively
inaccessible for much of our history. When people lived in small towns
and everybody knew each other’s business, there was no large-scale system of record-keeping in place. Today, people have a lot more anonymAmendment protection.”).
249. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986). This term, in Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), the Supreme Court held that there are certain limits
to how much technological enhancement of normal perception is permissible when it concluded that thermal sensors violated the Fourth Amendment.
250. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage because trash collectors had access to it);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that no reasonable expectation
of privacy in pen register of phone numbers dialed from a person’s home telephone existed
because the phone company could record this information); United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (holding there is no reasonable expectation in financial records
because banks had access to them).
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ity in the sense that they often conduct many day-to-day activities among
strangers. The majority of Americans live in larger communities and
frequently move to different places throughout their lifetimes.251 According to Janna Malamud Smith,
Control over private behavior, previously in the hands of the family, the community or neighborhood, and the church, is now redistributed, with more power
granted on the one hand to individuals, and on the other, at a greater distance, to
the bureaucracies and institutions that attempt to keep track of vast numbers of
mobile people . . . .252

We know that our lives will remain private not in the sense that the
information will be completely shielded from public access, but in the
sense that for the most part, it will be lost in a sea of information about
millions of people. Our personal information remains private because it
is a needle in a haystack, and usually nobody will take the time to try to
find it. This anonymity is rapidly disappearing as access to information
is increasing.
In limited contexts, some courts are beginning to abandon the secrecy paradigm, although most of privacy law still clings to it. In United
States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press,253 the Court held that the release of FBI “rap sheets” was an invasion of privacy within the privacy exemption of FOIA. The FBI rap
sheets contained the date of birth, physical description, and a history of
arrests, charges, and convictions on over twenty-four million people.254
FOIA exempts law enforcement records that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”255
The reporters claimed that the events summarized in the rap sheet were
not private because they had previously been publicly disclosed.256 The
Court rejected this argument:
In an organized society, there are few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another. Thus, the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at
common law rested in part on the degree of dissemination of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which the passage of time rendered it private. . . .
Recognition of this attribute of a privacy interest supports the distinction, in
terms of personal privacy, between scattered disclosure of the bits of information
contained in a rap sheet and revelation of the rap sheet as a whole . . . .257

As the Court further remarked, “there is a vast difference between the
public records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse
251. About 75% of people live in cities or in suburbs to urban areas. JANNA
MALAMUD SMITH, PRIVATE MATTERS: IN DEFENSE OF THE PERSONAL LIFE 65 (1997).
252. Id.
253. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
254. Id. at 751-52.
255. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2000).
256. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762-63.
257. Id. at 763-64 (citations omitted).
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files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the country
and a computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of information.”258
In cases involving the privacy torts,259 a few courts have recognized
a privacy interest in information exposed to the public. For example, in
Nader v. General Motors Corp.,260 Ralph Nader, a prominent public figure and outspoken critic of consumer safety, criticized the safety of General Motors’ automobiles for many years.261 General Motors, attempting
to discredit Nader’s reputation, interviewed his friends and acquaintances
to learn the private details of his life, kept him under surveillance, tapped
his telephone and eavesdropped into his conversations, and hired prostitutes to entrap him into an illicit relationship.262 Of particular relevance,
General Motors hired a person to “shadow” Nader in public—to follow
him around and watch him engage in day-to-day activities.263 The court
held that generally observation in public did not constitute an action for
the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.264 This tort protects against the intentional intrusion into one’s “solicitude or seclusion” or “his private affairs or concerns” that “would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”265 Because the tort requires an invasion of “seclusion,” courts have
typically rejected intrusion suits when plaintiffs have been in public
places.266 Nevertheless, in Nader, the court concluded that “overzealous” watching such as “shadowing” could rise to a level as to constitute a
violation of privacy (even though all the activities watched occurred in
public).267
Likewise, in cases involving the tort of public disclosure of private
facts, a few courts have held that information once public can be private
under certain circumstances. The tort of public disclosure permits a person to sue when one makes public “a matter concerning the private life of
another” in a way that “(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable per258. Id. at 764.
259. The privacy torts are often referred to collectively as “invasion of privacy” and
consist of (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light
or “publicity”; and (4) appropriation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
The torts were inspired by the famous article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
260. 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1970).
261. Id. at 767.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 771.
264. Id.
265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
266. See, e.g., Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471, 482-83 (D. Me.
1987) (holding that no intrusion occurred when photographers harassed and insulted the
plaintiff in a public place).
267. Nader, 255 N.E.2d at 771.
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son and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.”268 In Daily Times
Democrat v. Graham,269 a woman who went to a county fair had her
dress inadvertently blown up by air jets on the platform she was standing
on.270 A local newspaper photographer snapped a photo of the woman at
that moment, and it was published on the front page of the newspaper.271
The woman sued for a violation of the public disclosure tort.272 The
newspaper argued that the picture was taken in public and therefore, she
had no claim to privacy.273 The court, however, held that merely because
a person is involuntarily placed in an embarrassing pose in public does
not eliminate privacy.274
In Melvin v. Reid,275 which is frequently referred to as “The Red
Kimono” case, a former prostitute who was once criminally prosecuted
for murder had left the prostitution business long ago and led a normal
life.276 A motion picture company produced the film “The Red Kimono,” depicting her life story and using her maiden name.277 She sued
under the tort of public disclosure.278 The court held that, although she
could not claim that the facts about her life were private because they
were in the public record, there was no need for the movie to use her real
name.279
Likewise, in Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n,280 an article in
Reader’s Digest Magazine about hijacking disclosed that the plaintiff had
hijacked a truck.281 The crime occurred eleven years before the article;
Briscoe had rehabilitated himself and his new friends, family, and young
daughter were not aware of his previous life of crime.282 The court held
that although the article was newsworthy and the facts of Briscoe’s crime
could be disclosed, Briscoe could sue for the use of his name, which had
no relevance to the article at all.283
Generally, however, most courts still adhere to the secrecy paradigm
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964).
Id. at 476.
Id.
Id. at 475.
Id. at 477-78.
Id. at 478.
297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 93.
483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. at 39-40.
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and do not recognize a privacy interest when information is exposed to
the public. As a result, most courts have rejected the Reid and Briscoe
approach.284 In Forsher v. Bugliosi,285 the court noted that “California
courts have refrained from extending the Briscoe rule to other fact situations.”286 The court considered Briscoe “an exception to the more general rule that ‘once a man has become a public figure, or news, he remains a matter of legitimate recall to the public mind to the end of his
days.’”287 The Forsher decision was in line with the Restatement for the
tort of public disclosure: “There is no liability when the defendant merely
gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff that is already
public. Thus there is no liability for giving publicity to facts about the
plaintiff’s life which are matters of public record.”288 Likewise for the
tort of intrusion upon seclusion, the Restatement provides that “there is
no liability for the examination of a public record concerning the plaintiff.”289 Further, Briscoe seems foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,290 which held that when information is disclosed in documents open to the public, the press cannot be
punished for publishing it.291
In a number of cases, courts applying the constitutional right to information privacy have become mired in the secrecy paradigm. Courts
have refused to find a constitutional right to information privacy for data
that has previously been disclosed or exist in a public record. In Scheetz
v. Morning Call, Inc.,292 a court held that a husband and wife had no constitutional right to information privacy in a police report disclosed to the
press containing the wife’s allegations of spousal abuse.293 Although her
complaint to the police did not result in charges, “[t]he police could have
brought charges without her concurrence, at which point all the information would have wound up on the public record, where it would have
been non-confidential.”294 In Cline v. Rogers,295 the court held that the

284. Westphal v. Lakeland Register, 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2262, 2263 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
1977); Roshto v. Hebert, 439 So. 2d 428, 431 (La. 1983); Montesano v. Donrey Media
Group, 668 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Nev. 1983); Jenkins v. Bolla, 600 A.2d 1293, 1296-97 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992).
285. 608 P.2d 716 (Cal. 1980).
286. Id. at 726.
287. Id. (quoting William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 418 (1960)).
288. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).
289. Id. § 652B cmt. c.
290. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
291. Id. at 495.
292. 946 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1991).
293. Id. at 207.
294. Id.
295. 87 F.3d 176 (6th Cir. 1996).
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constitutional right to information privacy did not apply to the disclosure
of police records because “one’s criminal history is arguably not a private
‘personal matter’ at all, since arrest and conviction information are matters of public record.”296 In Walls v. City of Petersburg,297 the court upheld against a constitutional right to information privacy challenge a
questionnaire asking public employees the criminal histories of their family members, their complete marital history, including marriages, divorces, and children, and any outstanding debts or judgments against
them.298 The court reasoned that there was no privacy interest in this information because the data was already available in public records.299
Courts have also adhered to the secrecy paradigm in challenges to
Megan’s Laws, which mandate the disclosure of personal information
about convicted sex offenders after they have completed their prison sentences. In Russell v. Gregoire,300 convicted sex offenders challenged
Washington’s sex offender law, which provided for disclosure of their picture, name, age, date of birth, crimes, and vicinity of residence to government agencies, schools, and even to the media in certain instances.301 The
plaintiffs contended that Megan’s Law was unconstitutional under the constitutional right to information privacy, but the court held that the information was not private because it was “already fully available to the public.”302
In Paul P. v. Verniero,303 plaintiffs challenged New Jersey’s Megan’s
304
Disclosure would be to law enforcement officials, schools, and
Law.
community organizations for certain offenders and disclosure to all members of the public for the most severe offenders.305 The plaintiffs argued
that the statutorily required disclosure of their names, physical descriptions, and home addresses violated the constitutional right to information

296. Id. at 179; see also Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1994)
(“[A]n individual cannot expect to have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in
matters of public record.”).
297. 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990).
298. Id. at 190-95. Additionally, the questionnaire asked whether they had sexual relations with a person of the same sex. The court’s conclusion that no privacy interest existed for this information was based on a different rationale than the other questions. The
court concluded that under the “controlling” Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), there was no right to keep one’s sexual orientation private.
Walls, 895 F.2d at 193. It is unclear how Bowers controls on this proposition.
299. Walls, 895 F.2d at 193-94.
300. 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997).
301. Id. at 1082.
302. Id. at 1094.
303. 170 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1999).
304. Id. at 398.
305. Id. at 399.
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privacy.306 The court explicitly rejected the logic of Reporter’s Committee, but recognized that the plaintiffs were entitled to privacy protection
with regard to their address information.307
In sum, courts are deeply divided about whether to adhere to the secrecy paradigm. The Supreme Court clings to this paradigm in its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence but has abandoned it in its FOIA cases.308
Courts applying privacy torts have occasionally departed from the paradigm, but generally follow it.309 Unless the secrecy paradigm is abandoned, people will lose any ability to claim a privacy interest in the extensive personal information in public records.
2. Aggregation: The Digital Biography
Another longstanding notion of privacy is that it protects against
disclosure of particularly sensitive or intimate information. According to
this view, information that we should protect as private must be embarrassing or harmful to one’s reputation. However, the information in public records often consists of fairly innocuous details—such as one’s birth
date, address, height, weight, and so on. Eugene Volokh epitomizes this
view when he writes,
[M]any of the proposals to restrict communication of consumer transactional
data would apply far beyond a narrow core of highly private information, and
would cover all transactional information, such as the car, house, food, or
clothes one buys. I don’t deny that many people may find such speech vaguely
ominous and would rather that it not take place, and I acknowledge that some
people get extremely upset about it. . . . If such relatively modest offense or annoyance is enough to justify speech restrictions, then the compelling interest bar
has fallen quite low . . . .310

A number of courts have rejected claims that certain information
falls within state FOIA privacy exceptions because the information does
not pose immediate harm to one’s reputation or security. One court reasoned that “[n]ames and addresses are not ordinarily personal, intimate,
or embarrassing pieces of information.”311 Another court held that pay306. Id. at 398.
307. Id. at 400-01, 405. But see Doe v. Portiz, 662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J. 1995) (following the conception from Reporters Committee when examining the constitutionality of
Megan’s Law and noting that “a privacy interest is implicated when the government assembles . . . diverse pieces of information into a single package and disseminates that
package to the public, thereby ensuring that a person cannot assume anonymity”).
308. See supra notes 248-50, 253-58 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 260-308 and accompanying text.
310. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049,
1117 (2000).
311. State Employees Ass’n v. Dep’t of Mgmt. & Budget, 404 N.W.2d 606, 615
(Mich. 1987) (quoting Tobin v. Mich. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 331 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Mich.
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roll records of the Philadelphia Police Department that contained each
employee’s name, payroll number, gender, date of birth, annual salary,
and other personal data were subject to disclosure because the records did
not harm the officer’s reputation.312 Information about teacher salaries,
according to one court, did not fall within the sunshine law privacy exception because “[t]he salaries of public employees and schoolteachers
are not ‘intimate details . . . the disclosure of which might harm the individual.’”313
If the release of certain information in public records does not make
one blush or reveal one’s deepest secrets, then what is the harm? I contend that the nature of the harm stems from what I call the “aggregation
problem.” Viewed in isolation, each piece of our day-to-day information
is not all that telling; viewed in combination, it begins to paint a portrait
about our personalities. The aggregation problem arises from the fact
that the digital revolution has enabled information to be easily amassed
and combined. Even information in public records that is superficial or
incomplete can be quite useful in obtaining more data about individuals.
Information breeds information. For example, although one’s Social Security number does not in and of itself reveal much about an individual, it
provides access to one’s financial information, educational records,
medical records, and a whole host of other information.
In a parable, The Circular Ruins, Jorge Luis Borges describes a person who aspires to dream a man in “painstaking detail” so as to create an
imaginary being so real that he can move from the world of dreams into
the world of reality.314 The person begins by imagining the man’s heart
and then adds details each night:
He dreamed the heart warm, active, secret—about the size of a closed fist, a
garret-colored thing inside the dimness of a human body that was still faceless
and sexless . . . . Each night he perceived it with greater clarity, greater certainty. . . . On the fourteenth night, he stroked the pulmonary artery with his
forefinger, and then the entire heart, inside and out. . . . Before the year was out
he had reached the skeleton, the eyelids.315

Eventually, the person completes his goal and has assembled
enough details to create a dreamed being so realistic that the being be1982)).
312. Moak v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 336 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
313. Mans v. Lebanon Sch. Bd., 290 A.2d 866, 868 (N.H. 1972) (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 1497, at 11 (1966)) (discussing federal FOIA); see also Pottle v. Sch. Comm. of
Braintree, 482 N.E.2d 813, 816-17 (Mass. 1985) (holding that payroll records containing
names, salaries, overtime pay, and addresses of policemen and school employees were not
private within the meaning of Massachusetts’s FOIA privacy exception because the information was not intimate).
314. JORGE LUIS BORGES, The Circular Ruins, in COLLECTED FICTIONS 96, 97 (Andrew Hurley trans., 1998).
315. Id. at 98.
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comes real.316 At the end of the parable, the dreamer realizes that he is
but the dreamed person of another.317
Borges’s parable illustrates the power of aggregating details. In the
Information Age, personal data is being combined to create a “digital biography” about us. Information that appears innocuous can sometimes
be the missing link, the critical detail in one’s digital biography, or the
key necessary to unlock other stores of personal information. There are
several aspects of this digital biography that raise alarm.
To the extent that the digital biography is accurate, our lives are not
only revealed and recorded, but also can be analyzed and investigated.
Our digital biographies are being assembled by companies like ChoicePoint, which are amassing personal information in public records along
with other information.318 Collectively, millions of biographies can be
searched, sorted, and analyzed in a matter of seconds. This enables automated investigations of individuals on a nationwide scale by both the
government and the private sector. Increasingly, private sector entities
are conducting investigations which can have profound consequences on
people’s lives–such as their employment and financial condition. Employers are resorting to information brokers of public record information
to assist in screening job applicants and existing employees. For example, the firm HireCheck serves over 4000 employers to conduct background checks for new hires or current employees.319 It conducts a national search of outstanding warrants, a Social Security number search to
locate age, past and current employers, and former addresses, a driver record search, a search of worker’s compensation claims “to avoid habitual
claimants or to properly channel assignments,” a check of civil lawsuit
records, as well as searches for many other types of information.320
These investigations occur without any external oversight, and individuals often do not have an opportunity to challenge the results.321
Although the digital biography contains a host of details about a
person, it captures a distorted persona, one who is constructed by a variety of external details. The digital biography falls short of the perfection
achieved by the dreamer in Borges’s parable. The problem, as Arthur
Miller observed decades ago, is that an “individual who is asked to provide a simple item of information for what he believes to be a single pur316. Id. at 99.
317. Id. at 100.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
319. Hire Check, Welcome to Hirecheck, at http://www.hirecheck.com/ flashintro/index.html (last viewed July 1, 2002).
320. Hire Check, Background Screening, at http://www.hirecheck.com/ ProductsAndServices/background Screening.html (last viewed July 1, 2002).
321. Id.
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pose may omit explanatory details that become crucial when his file is
surveyed for unrelated purposes.”322 Further, although the data in public
records combined with the information marketers glean about us can be
quite revealing, it still cannot penetrate into our thoughts and often only
partially captures who we are. W.H. Auden’s 1940 poem, The Unknown
Citizen, depicts the situation with eerie foresight:
He was found by the Bureau of Statistics to be
One against whom there was no official complaint,
And all the reports on his conduct agree
That, in the modern sense of an old-fashioned word, he was a saint,
For in everything he did he served the Greater Community.
Except for the War until the day he retired
He worked in a factory and never got fired,
But satisfied his employers, Fudge Motors, Inc.
Yet he wasn’t a scab or odd in his views,
For his Union reports that he paid his dues,
(Our report on his Union shows it was sound)
And our Social Psychology workers found
That he was popular with his mates and liked a drink.
The Press are convinced that he bought a paper every day
And that his reactions to advertisements were normal in every way.
Policies taken out in his name prove that he was fully insured,
And his Health-card shows he was once in hospital but left it cured.
Both Producers Research and High-Grade Living declare
He was fully sensible to the advantages of the Instalment Plan
And had everything necessary to the Modern Man,
A phonograph, a radio, a car and a frigidaire.
Our researchers into Public Opinion are content
That he held the proper opinions for the time of year;
When there was peace, he was for peace; when there was war,
he went.
He was married and added five children to the population,
Which our Eugenicist says was the right number for a parent of
his generation,
And our teachers report that he never interfered with their education.
Was he free? Was he happy? The question is absurd:
Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard.323

322. MILLER, supra note 52, at 34.
323. W.H. AUDEN, The Unknown Citizen, in COLLECTED POEMS 201 (Edward Mendelson ed., 1976). Used by permission of Random House, Inc. Copyright 1940 and re-
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This poem aptly captures how day-to-day information both reveals
and distorts. Auden illustrates how our lives are captured to a significant
degree by the information we leave behind. Yet the information about
our property, our professions, our purchases, our finances, and our medical history does not tell the whole story. We are more than the bits of
data we give off as we go about our lives. Our digital biography is revealing of ourselves but in a rather standardized way. It consists of bits of
information pre-defined based on the judgment of the government or
some entity about what categories of information are relevant or important. We are partially captured by details such as our age, race, gender,
net worth, property owned, and so on, but only in a manner that standardizes us into types or categories. Indeed, database marketers frequently
classify consumers into certain categories based on stereotypes about
their values, their lifestyle, and their purchasing habits.324 Our digital biography is thus an unauthorized biography, only partially true and very
reductive. We must all live with such unauthorized biographies about us,
the complete contents of which we often do not get to see. Although certainly a more extensive dossier might be less reductive in capturing our
personalities, it would have greater controlling effects on an individual’s
life.
Our digital biographies are not only reductive but are often inaccurate. In today’s bureaucratized world, one of the growing threats is that
we will be subject to the inadvertence, carelessness, and mindlessness of
bureaucracy. A scene from the movie Brazil illustrates this problem by
way of dark humor.325 The movie opens with an exhausted bureaucrat
swatting a fly, which inconspicuously drops into a typewriter, causing a
jam, and resulting in a mistyped letter in a person’s last name on a
form.326 The paper is a form authorizing the arrest and interrogation of
suspected rebels. In the next scene, the innocent man whose name was
wrongly typed on the form peacefully sits with his family when suddenly
scores of armor-clad police storm into his tiny apartment and haul him
away.327
These dangers are not merely the imaginary stuff of movies. The
burgeoning use of databases of public record information by the private
sector in screening job applicants and investigating existing employees
demonstrates how errors can potentially destroy a person’s career. Even
before the ready accessibility of public records, significant problems
newed 1968 by W.H. Auden.
324. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1424.
325. BRAZIL (Universal Pictures 1985).
326. Id.
327. Id.
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emerged from the use of such information. For example, in Paul v.
Davis,328 the police distributed flyers with names and photographs to
various stores erroneously listing the plaintiff as an active shoplifter.329
The plaintiff almost lost his job and was afraid to enter stores.330 In a
more recent example involving computerized information, a Maryland
woman wrongly arrested for a burglary was not cleared from the state’s
criminal databases.331 Her name and Social Security number also migrated to a Baltimore County database relating to child protective services cases.332 She was fired from her job as a substitute teacher, and
only after she could establish that the information was in error was she
rehired.333 When she later left that job to run a day care center for the
United States’ military, she was subject to questioning about the erroneous arrest.334 Later on, when employed at as a child care director at a
YMCA, she was terminated when her arrest record surfaced in a background clearance check; she could not have the error expunged in sufficient time, so the job was given to another person.335 Only after several
years was the error cleared from the public records.336 In another example, as described earlier, the errors in the data supplied by ChoicePoint to
the Florida elections officials possibly resulted in the loss of many people’s right to vote.337 To the extent that our digital biographies are increasingly relied upon to make important decisions, the problems that errors can cause will only escalate in frequency and magnitude.
Beyond these difficulties, our digital biographies greatly increase
our vulnerability to a variety of dangers. For example, a website called
the “Nuremberg Files” posted information about doctors working in
abortion clinics, including names, photos, Social Security numbers, home
addresses, descriptions of their cars, and information about their families.338 The website drew a black line through the names of murdered
doctors and shaded wounded doctors’ names in gray.339 Fearing for their
lives and the lives of their families, the doctors sued to shut the website
down, but the Ninth Circuit held that the website had a First Amendment
328. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
329. Id. at 695.
330. Id. at 696-97.
331. Eugene L. Meyer, Md. Woman Caught in Wrong Net; Data Errors Link Her To
Probes, Cost 3 Jobs, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1997, at C1.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
338. See CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 42-43 (1999).
339. Id. at 43-44.

2002]

ACCESS AND AGGREGATION

1185

right to publish the information.340 The Nuremberg Files case illustrates
the dangers created from the increased access to public record information.
As public record information becomes more readily available,
criminals can use it to gain access to a person’s financial accounts. For
example, one industrious criminal gained access to the financial accounts
of a number of individuals on Forbes Magazine’s list of the 400 richest
people in America such as Oprah Winfrey and George Lucas.341 One of
the most rapidly escalating forms of crime is identity theft.342 Identity
theft occurs when an individual’s personal information is stolen to open
new bank accounts, acquire credit cards, obtain loans, and so on. In fact,
the FBI stated that identity theft is the fastest-growing form of whitecollar criminal activity in the United States.343 Identity thieves frequently obtain personal information necessary for their criminal activity
through information brokers, who sell reports about individuals based on
public record data combined with other information.344 Identity theft
creates severe hardship for victims, who must spend countless hours—
estimated at about 175 hours over two years—to mend the damage to
their credit.345
Public record information also proves useful for stalkers. In 1989, a
fan obsessed with actress Rebecca Shaeffer located her home address
with the help of a private investigator who obtained it from California

340. See Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 101920 (9th Cir. 2001).
341. Jayson Blair & William K. Rashbaum, Man Broke Into Accounts of Celebrities,
Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2001, at B3.
342. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Identity Thieves Thrive in Information Age: Rise of Online
Data Brokers Makes Criminal Impersonation Easier, WASH. POST, May 31, 2001, at A1.
According to estimates by the Federal Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, there are
half a million victims of identity theft each year. Id. For a detailed discussion of identity
theft, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem,
80 TEX. L. REV. 89 (2001). According to LoPucki, the problem of identity theft is not
caused by the widespread accessibility of personal information but by the private sector’s
use of Social Security numbers, addresses, and mothers’ maiden names as passwords. See
id. at 108-14. Accordingly, LoPucki proposes a system where people publicly register
their identities and provide data for identification. See id. at 114-35. I agree with LoPucki
that restrictions must be placed on the way that the private sector maintains the security of
personal information. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1460. However, as described herein,
there are other problems associated with the widespread disclosure of personal information. Even if LoPucki’s solution combats the identity theft problem, it can contribute to
these other problems.
343. Jennifer S. Lee, Fighting Back When Someone Steals Your Name, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2001, § 3, at 8.
344. O’Harrow, supra note 342.
345. See Lee, supra note 343.
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motor vehicles records.346 The fan murdered her outside her home.347
This killing spurred Congress to pass the DPPA, which restricts the
states’ ability to release motor vehicle records.348 Ironically, however,
the Act provided an exception permitting the disclosure of personal information to private investigators without an individual’s consent.349
At a more abstract level, the existence of digital biographies alters
the nature of the society we live in. In 1971, in his highly influential
work on privacy, Arthur Miller warned of the “possibility of constructing
a sophisticated data center capable of generating a comprehensive wombto-tomb dossier on every individual and transmitting it to a wide range of
data users over a national network.”350 On a number of occasions, the
federal government has flirted with the idea of creating a national database of personal information. The Johnson Administration contemplated
creating a National Data Center that would combine information collected by various federal agencies into one large computer database, but
the plan was scrapped after a public outcry.351 Again, in the early 1970s,
an official in the General Services Administration proposed that all of the
federal government’s computer systems be connected in a network called
FEDNET.352 Responding to a public outcry, Vice President Gerald Ford
stopped the plan.353
Although these proposals have been halted due to public outcries,
we have been inching toward a system of de facto national identification
for some time and are precariously close to having one.354 The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 requires new employees to supply
identification and proof of United States citizenship before obtaining a
new job.355 In a recent effort to track down parents who fail to pay child
support, the federal government has created a vast database consisting of
346. Lessley Anderson, Watching the I-Detectives, INDUS. STANDARD, Nov. 30,
1998, available at http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,2581, 00.html.
347. See id.
348. See REGAN, supra note 170, at 102.
349. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(8) (2000).
350. MILLER, supra note 52, at 39.
351. See, e.g., SYKES, supra note 338, at 44. In 1965, the Ruggles Committee issued a
report urging that decentralized data among federal agencies be consolidated. See SMITH,
supra note 4, at 309 Due to a large public outcry, the proposal was abandoned. See id. at
310-11; see also Note, Privacy and Efficient Government: Proposals for a National Data
Center, 82 HARV. L. REV. 400, 404 (1968).
352. SMITH, supra note 4, at 311.
353. Id.
354. See Richard Sobel, The Degradation of Political Identity Under a National Identification System, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 37, 39 (2002). See generally AMITAI ETZIONI,
THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999).
355. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603 100 Stat. 3359
(1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a-1365 (2000)).
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information about all people who obtain a new job anywhere in the nation. The database contains their Social Security numbers, addresses, and
wages.356 The ready availability of one’s Social Security number and the
ability to combine it with a host of other information about individuals
will make increasingly more possible a reality where typing an individual’s name into a searchable database will pull up a “womb-to-tomb”
dossier.
Such a reality can pose significant dangers. “Identity systems and
documents,” observes Richard Sobel, “have a long history of uses and
abuses for social control and discrimination.”357 Slaves were required to
carry identifying papers to travel; identification cards were used by the
Nazis in locating Jews; and the slaughter of Tutsis in Rwanda was aided
by a system of identifiers.358 In addition to facilitating the monitoring
and control of individuals, such a dossier may make a person a “prisoner
of his recorded past.”359 Records of personal information can easily be
used by government leaders and officials for improper monitoring of individuals. Indeed, such data can be used for whatever task is at hand—a
tool available to anyone in power in government for use to further the
current passion or whim of the day. In 1942, the Census Bureau used its
data from the 1940 census to assist in the effort to intern JapaneseAmericans during World War II.360 Currently, we do not know the full
consequences of living in a dossier society, but we are rapidly moving
toward becoming such a society without sufficient foresight and preparation.
The problems and dangers illustrated above are not merely the
product of the actions of the government. Rather, these troubles are
caused by the way that both public and private sector entities are using
personal information. The issue concerns more than isolated threats and
harms, but is fundamentally about the structure of our society. Not only
are public records altering the power that the government can exercise
over people’s lives, but they are also contributing to the growing power
of private sector entities. Elsewhere, I described the problem of private
sector collection and use of personal information, and I argued that Franz
Kafka’s The Trial is an appropriate metaphor to conceptualize this prob-

356. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended at scattered sections of
7, 8, 21, 25 & 42 U.S.C. (2000)). See generally Robert O’ Harrow, Jr., Uncle Sam Has All
Your Numbers, WASH. POST, June 27,1999 at A1.
357. Sobel, supra note 354, at 48.
358. See id. at 50-53.
359. HEW 1973 REPORT, supra note 172, at 112.
360. See LARSON, supra note 50, at 53-54.
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lem.361 In The Trial, a bureaucratic court system has assembled a dossier
of information about the protagonist, Joseph K., and suddenly arrests him
one morning. K. is never informed of the reason for his arrest, and he
embarks on a frustrating quest to find out why he has been arrested and
the nature of the proceedings against him. His information is in the
hands of an entity that is obscure, unaccountable, and uncontrolled.
Like The Trial, the current collection and use of personal information are used to make decisions affecting an individual’s life, yet individuals often have no way to participate and no notice about what is happening. Although people may be aware that dossiers are being
assembled about them, they have no idea what information the dossiers
contain or how the dossiers are being used. For example, the HEW Report in 1973 aptly observed
There was a time when information about an individual tended to be elicited in
face-to-face contacts involving personal trust and a certain symmetry, or balance, between giver and receiver. Nowadays, an individual must increasingly
give information about himself to large and relatively faceless institutions, for
handling and use by strangers—unknown, unseen, and, all too frequently, unresponsive. Sometimes the individual does not even know that an organization
maintains a record about him. Often he may not see it, much less contest its accuracy, control its dissemination, or challenge its use by others.362

This reality creates a sense of unease, vulnerability, and powerlessness—a deepening sense that one is at the mercy of others, or, perhaps
even more alarming, at the mercy of a bureaucratic process that is arbitrary, irresponsible, opaque, and indifferent to people’s dignity and welfare.
The problem with information collection and use today is not
merely that individuals are no longer able to exercise control over their
information; it is that their information is subjected to a bureaucratic process that is itself out of control.363 Without this process being subject to
regulation and control and without individuals having rights to exercise
some dominion over their information, individuals will be routinely subjected to the ills of bureaucracy.
Public records contribute to this privacy problem because they are
often a principal source of information for the private sector in the construction of their databases. Marketers stock their databases with public
record information, and the uses to which these databases are put are
manifold and potentially limitless. The personal information in public
records is often supplied involuntarily and typically for a purpose linked
to the reason why particular records are kept. The problem is that, often

361. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1419.
362. HEW 1973 REPORT, supra note 172, at 29.
363. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1440.
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without the individual’s knowledge or consent, the information is then
used for a host of different purposes by both the government and businesses.
Therefore, the privacy problem caused by public records concerns
the structure of information flow—the way that information circulates
throughout our society. The problem is not necessarily the disclosure of
secrets or the injury of reputations, but is one created by increased access
and aggregation of data. Privacy is an issue that concerns what type of
society we want to construct for the future. Do we want to live in a
Kafkaesque world where dossiers about individuals circulate in an elaborate underworld of public and private sector bureaucracies without the
individual having notice, knowledge, or the ability to monitor or control
the ways the information is used?
C. TRANSPARENCY AND PRIVACY: RECONCILING THE TENSION
How can the tension between transparency and privacy be reconciled? Must access to public records be sacrificed at the altar of privacy?
Or must privacy evaporate in order for government to be disinfected by
sunlight?
It is my thesis that both transparency and privacy can be balanced
through limitations on the access and use of personal information in public records. Of course, we must rethink what information belongs in public records. But we must also regulate the uses of our digital biographies.
Government is not doing enough to protect against the uses of the information that it routinely pumps into the public domain. If we abandon the
notion that privacy is an exclusive status, and recognize that information
in public records can still remain private even if there is limited access to
it, then a workable compromise for the tension between transparency and
privacy emerges. We can make information accessible for certain purposes only. When government discloses information, it can limit how it
discloses that information by preventing it from being amassed by companies for commercial purposes, to be sold to others, or to be combined
with other information and sold back to the government.
Much of the personal information in public records is not necessary
to shed light on the way government carries out its functions. Rather,
this information reveals more about the people who are the subjects of
the government’s regulatory machinery. In the FOIA context, the Court
has recognized that FOIA should not be interpreted beyond its purpose—
requiring disclosure for information that “would not shed any light on the
conduct of any Government agency or official.”364 Nevertheless, al364. United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 773 (1989); see also Schwartz, supra note 152, at 594.
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though the federal FOIA has served to shed light on government activities and has supplied critical information for hundreds of books and articles,365 it has also been used as a tool for commercial interests. The vast
majority of FOIA requests are made by businesses for commercial purposes.366 According to Judge Patricia Wald, FOIA turns agencies into
“information brokers” rather than “a window for public assessment of
how government works.”367 When weighing interests under the privacy
exceptions to the federal FOIA, although courts cannot consider the identity and purpose of the requester, they can take into account the relationship of the requested document to the purposes of FOIA.368 Unlike the
federal FOIA, many states routinely permit access by information brokers without looking to the purposes of their sunshine laws or the public
interest.
State FOIAs generally do not permit any discrimination among requesters. In a number of cases, states wanting to restrict access to people
requesting records for commercial use had no statutory authority to do
so. In Dunhill v. Director, District of Columbia Department of Transportation,369 a marketer of personal information about individuals sought
a listing on computer tape of the names, addresses, birth dates, gender,
and expiration date of drivers permits of all people holding valid District
of Columbia drivers permits.370 The court held that the government had
to release the information because the statute did not authorize the government to look to the motives of the request.371 In In re Crawford,372 a
preparer of bankruptcy petitions for debtors challenged the requirement
that he divulge his Social Security number on the petition, which would
then be made public. The court recognized that although the person had
a privacy right in his Social Security number and that disclosure exposed
him to dangers of fraud and identity theft, the interest in public access “is
of special importance in the bankruptcy arena, as unrestricted access to
365. Cate et al., supra note 139, at 65.
366. See id. at 50-51 (citing studies by the General Accounting Office, Department of
Health and Human Services, and the Department of Defense).
367. Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the
Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 667 (1984).
368. See, e.g., United States Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 178 (1991) (“The
addition of the redacted identifying information would not shed any additional light on the
Government’s conduct of its obligation.”); Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772 (1989); see
also Halloran v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 315, 323 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[I]f disclosure of
the requested information does not serve the purpose of informing the citizenry about the
activities of their government, disclosure will not be warranted even though the public
may nonetheless prefer, albeit for other reasons, that the information be released.”).
369. 416 A.2d 244 (D.C. 1980).
370. Id. at 246.
371. Id. at 247-48.
372. 194 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999).
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judicial records fosters confidence among creditors regarding the fairness
of the bankruptcy system.”373 Thus, the court formalistically invoked the
principle of transparency, relying on the vague argument that total transparency fosters “confidence.”
The danger with any principle is that it can drift to different uses
over time. J.M. Balkin explains this problem as “ideological drift.”
“Ideological drift in law means that legal ideas and symbols will change
their political valence as they are used over and over again in new contexts.”374 Laws fostering transparency are justified as shedding light into
the dark labyrinths of government bureaucracy to expose its inner workings to public scrutiny, and preventing the harrowing situation in Kafka’s
The Trial—a bureaucracy that worked in clandestine and mysterious
ways, completely unaccountable and unchecked. These are certainly
laudable goals, for they are essential to democracy and to the people’s
ability to keep government under control. However, sunshine laws are
increasingly becoming a tool for powerful corporations to collect information about individuals to further their own commercial interests, not to
shed light on the government. A window to look in on the government is
transforming into a window for the government and allied private sector
entities to peer in on individuals. The data collected about individuals is
then subject to a bureaucratic process that is often careless, uncontrolled,
and clandestine. Because private sector bureaucracies lack the transparency of those of government, there is a greater potential for personal information to be abused. Paradoxically, a right of access designed to empower individuals and protect them from the ills of bureaucracy can lead
to exactly the opposite result.
There are certainly instances where information about individuals
can provide illumination on the way that the government is functioning.
The examination of accident reports may reveal useful information about
widespread problems with particular vehicles. Scrutiny of police records
may indicate problems in police investigation and enforcement. Information about the salaries of public school teachers and other public officials
and employees may enable the public to assess whether such officials and
employees are being over- or under-compensated. Disciplinary information about such employees can allow taxpayers to assess the performance
of those who are earning their tax dollars. However, many of these purposes can be achieved through evaluating aggregate statistical data or by
examining records with redacted personal identifying information.
The solution is not to eliminate all access to public records, but to

373. Id. at 960.
374. J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV.
869, 871 (1993).
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redact personal information where possible and to regulate specific uses
of information. Real property information must be made available for
certain purposes, but it should not be available for all purposes. It is necessary for a litigant to obtain the address of a celebrity the litigant desires
to sue in order to serve process; however, to disclose the address to fans
or to publish it on the Internet is different.
Use restriction laws, such as those discussed above in Part I.B, are a
step in the right direction. These laws attempt to navigate the tension between transparency and privacy by permitting the use of public record
information for certain purposes but not all purposes. One of the longstanding Fair Information Practices is purpose specification—that personal information obtained for one purpose cannot be used for another
purpose without an individual’s consent.375 Often the purposes for the
government collection of personal information vary widely from the purposes for which they are used after they are disclosed in public records.
Governments collecting personal information should limit such uncontrolled drift in use. Access should be granted for uses furthering traditional functions of transparency such as the watchdog function; access
should be denied for commercial solicitation uses because such uses do
not adequately serve the functions of transparency. Rather, such uses
make public records a cheap marketing tool, resulting in the further
spread of personal information, which is often resold among marketers.
Use restriction laws must go beyond basic restrictions on access for
commercial solicitation. The use of public records by information brokers or other entities that aggregate personal information and sell it to
others is deeply problematic for the reasons discussed earlier in this Part.
Although information brokers have brought a new level of accessibility
to public records by combining them together in gigantic databases available online, they have also contributed greatly to the creation of the digital biography. This type of aggregated public record information is often
not used for the purposes of checking governmental abuse or monitoring
governmental activities. Rather, it is used to investigate individuals.
This investigation is at the behest of other individuals, private detectives,
employers, and law enforcement officials. Information brokers such as
ChoicePoint collect public record information and supplement it with a
host of other personal information, creating a convenient investigation

375. See HEW 1973 REPORT, supra note 172, at viii. The Fair Information Practices
were developed by the United Stated Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) in 1973, and they consist of a number of principles for the use and processing of
personal information. The Fair Information Practices have proven to be highly influential
in United States law as well as throughout the world. See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶ 44, at http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/01_STLE_index.htm.
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tool for government entities. The use of information brokers by the government to investigate citizens runs directly counter to the spirit of freedom of information laws, which were designed to empower individuals
to monitor their government, not vice versa.
Certain information should be restricted from public records completely. The Administrative Office proposal to separate both paper and
electronic documents into a public and private file for civil cases and to
restrict access to certain documents in criminal proceedings such as presentence reports is a step in the right direction.376 One example of information that should be excluded from public records is a person’s Social Security number. Social Security numbers serve as a gateway to
highly sensitive information such as financial accounts, school records,
and a host of other data. Social Security numbers are very difficult to replace if they fall into the hands of an identity thief. As a routine practice,
Social Security numbers should automatically be redacted from every
document before being disclosed publicly.
Jurors, parties to litigation, and witnesses should all be informed of
the extent to which their personal information could become a public record and must be given an opportunity to voice their privacy concerns
and have information redacted.
The federal Privacy Act must be amended to provide more meaningful protection. Its restrictions on the use of Social Security numbers must
be strengthened to regulate and restrict the use of Social Security numbers by the private sector. Further, the Privacy Act should contain meaningful remedies for violations and the “routine use” exception must be
significantly tightened.
Finally, more laws like the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act are necessary to nationalize public records law. We are becoming an information society where information is no longer localized. People frequently
move from state to state and often do not live where they were born or
grew up. We need a strong national information policy rather than the
widely differing state public record regimes. This is the most efficient
and effective means to govern information flow in the United States. A
uniform baseline provides a good way to ensure privacy, for all citizens
to know about their privacy rights in public record information, and for
all users of information to know their responsibilities.
Therefore, a federal baseline should be established to govern public
records in all states. This law should not preempt states from adopting
stricter protections of privacy, but it must provide a meaningful floor of

376. Judicial Conference, Request for Comment on Privacy and Public Access to
Electronic Case Files (Sept. 26, 2001), available at http:// www.privacy.uscourts.gov/
RFC.htm.
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protection. Although each state should adopt its own statute akin to the
federal Privacy Act, one option would be to extend the federal Privacy
Act to the states.
We may never be able to achieve complete secrecy of information in
many situations and, in some situations, complete secrecy would be undesirable. We can, however, limit accessibility and use. The next Part
examines to what extent the Constitution might limit this approach.
III. PUBLIC RECORDS AND THE CONSTITUTION
In this Part, I examine whether the access and use restrictions I advocated in Part II can pass muster under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Understood broadly, the First Amendment
protects openness in information flow. First, the Court and lower courts
have held that the First Amendment provides certain rights of access to at
least some government proceedings and records. Restrictions on the information available in public records might infringe upon this right.
Second, freedom of speech and the press prevent the government from
restricting the disclosure and dissemination of information. A close
analysis of the Court’s decisions, however, reveals that access and use
restrictions are constitutional.
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO ACCESS
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment mandates that certain government proceedings be open to
the public. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,377 a plurality of
the Court concluded that the First Amendment provided the public with a
right of access to criminal trials.378 Although seven Justices agreed that
the First Amendment provides a right of access to trials, no rationale
achieved a majority.
Two years later, the Court coalesced around an approach in Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.379 There, a Massachusetts law mandated that criminal trials be closed in all cases where juvenile victims of
sexual assault testified to protect their privacy.380 The Court struck down
the law, reasoning that a “major purpose” of the First Amendment is “to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”381 The Court articulated a two-prong test to determine whether the right to access applies,
first looking to whether the proceeding “historically has been open to the
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

448 U.S. 555 (1980).
Id. at 575-78.
457 U.S. 596 (1982).
Id. at 623.
Id. at 604 (citation omitted).
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press and general public” and then examining whether access “plays a
particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and
the government as a whole.”382 According to the Court, “public access to
criminal trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a check
upon the judicial process—an essential component in our structure of
self-government.”383 The Court recognized that the right to access criminal trials is not absolute. A state can deny access to criminal proceedings
if “the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”384 Although the state interest
to protect juvenile sexual assault victims was compelling, the Court concluded that the mandatory rule requiring closure in all cases was too
broad.385
Shortly after Globe, the Court resolved that the right to access extends beyond the immediate criminal trial to jury selection. In PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I),386 a trial for capital murder, the trial court severely restricted public access to the questioning of prospective jurors. Press-Enterprise moved for a release of the
complete transcript of the voir dire proceedings, but the trial court refused because of concern for juror privacy since certain sensitive matters
were discussed.387 The Court held that there is a public interest in ensuring that jurors are “fairly and openly selected,”388 and concluded that the
trial court too broadly closed off access and failed to consider alternatives
that were available to protect the jurors’ privacy.389
The Court extended the right to access to pretrial proceedings in
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II).390 The
Court reasoned that historical practice in the United States had been “to
conduct preliminary hearings in open court”391 and that public access to
preliminary hearings served as an important “safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”392
Lower courts determining the applicability of the First Amendment
right to access apply the two-prong test of Globe Newspaper and the

382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

Id. at 605-06.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 607.
See id. at 607-08.
464 U.S. 501 (1984).
Id. at 504.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 512.
478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 12-13 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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Press-Enterprise cases. Following the lead of the Supreme Court, lower
courts have proclaimed that the right to access to criminal proceedings
applies not only to trials, pretrial proceedings, and jury selection, but also
to pretrial suppression, due process, and entrapment hearings,393 as well
as bail hearings.394
Although the Court has never squarely addressed whether the right
of access applies beyond criminal proceedings, several lower courts have
extended it to civil cases. For example, in Publicker Industries, Inc. v.
Cohen,395 the court reasoned that there was a long tradition for open civil
trials and that “the civil trial, like the criminal trial, plays a particularly
significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole.”396 Further, although no Supreme Court case directly
addresses whether the First Amendment requires access to court documents, several courts “have concluded that the logic of Press-Enterprise
II extends to at least some categories of court documents and records.”397
Not all courts agree, however.398
Courts have rarely applied the First Amendment right to access beyond court records to other public records. The rationale for the right to
access turns on the need for knowledge about the government as an essential component of discourse about the government. Although the
Court’s cases involve judicial proceedings, the rationale can be logically
extended beyond such proceedings. Therefore, even if a state did not
have a sunshine law or a common law right of access, the Constitution
might be interpreted to require a degree of openness.
Nevertheless, even under an expansive view, the right to access does
not apply to efforts to restrict the access to personal information for particular uses. When public records illuminate government functioning,
access to government records is generally consistent with the rationale
for the First Amendment right to access. However, the grand purposes
behind the right to access are simply not present in the context of much
information gathering from public records today. As discussed in Part II,
393. See United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 1982).
394. See United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983).
395. 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
396. Id. at 1070 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
397. United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Access means more than the ability
to attend open court proceedings; it encompasses the right of the public to inspect and to
copy judicial records.”); Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143,
1145 (4th Cir. 1984) (“There is no reason to distinguish between pretrial proceedings and
the documents filed in regard to them.”).
398. Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir. 1994)
(“[T]here is no general First Amendment right in the public to access criminal justice records.”).
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public records are becoming a tool for powerful private sector interests to
use in furtherance of commercial gain. These uses engender significant
threats to individuals and to the structure of our society, and they do not
shed light on the government.
In fact, the Constitution does not simply require open information
flow; it also establishes certain responsibilities for the way that the government uses the information it collects. The Court has held that there are
circumstances where the government cannot force individuals to disclose
personal information absent a compelling government interest. In
NAACP v. Alabama,399 the Court struck down a state statute requiring the
NAACP to disclose a list of the names and addresses of its members.
The Court observed that there is a “vital relationship between freedom to
associate and privacy in one’s associations.”400 Noting that revelation of
membership in the NAACP exposed members to potential economic reprisal and physical violence, the Court declared that “[i]nviolability of
privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association.”401 NAACP v. Alabama
suggests that the government cannot expose citizens to the potential perils that public disclosure may bring. Reasoning in a similar fashion, in
Greidinger v. Davis,402 the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia’s voter registration system, which required voters to provide their Social Security
numbers (which were then made publicly available), was unconstitutional
because it forced people to risk public disclosure of their Social Security
numbers in order to vote.403 These cases can be read to establish the important principle that the fear of disclosure of personal information collected by the government is a recognized injury, one that can interfere
with the exercise of fundamental rights.
Further, under the constitutional right to privacy, the Court has held
that government has a duty to protect privacy when it collects personal
data. In 1977, the Court addressed whether the right to privacy established in Griswold v. Connecticut,404 Eisenstadt v. Baird,405 and Roe v.
Wade406 extended to issues involving information as opposed to decisions about one’s body, sexual conduct, or health. In the landmark case
Whalen v. Roe,407 the Court held that the right to privacy encompassed
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Id. at 462.
Id.
988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1354.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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the protection of personal information. At issue in Whalen was a recordkeeping system of people who obtained prescriptions for certain addictive medications.408 The plaintiffs argued that the statute infringed upon
their right to privacy.409 The Court proclaimed that the constitutionally
protected “zone of privacy” extends to two distinct types of interests: (1)
decisional privacy, which the Court defined as “independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions”; and (2) information privacy, which
the Court defined as the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters.”410 The Court concluded,
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast
amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive
government files. . . . The right to collect and use such data for public purposes
is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosures. . . . [I]n some circumstances that duty arguably has its
roots in the Constitution . . . . 411

Whalen recognized that when the government collected personal information, it took on a responsibility to keep it secure and avoid disclosing it to others.412
Since its creation in Whalen, the constitutional right to information
privacy has begun to evolve in the courts.413 The full extent of the gov408. Such medications included opium, cocaine, methadone, and amphetamines which
were used in treating epilepsy, narcolepsy, migraine headaches, and certain psychological
disorders. See id. at 593 n.8.
409. Id. at 598.
410. Id. at 599-600.
411. Id. at 605.
412. The Court reiterated this notion of constitutional protection for information privacy in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977), concluding
that President Nixon had a constitutional privacy interest in records of his private communications with his family. Id.
413. After Whalen and Nixon, the Court has done little to develop the right of information privacy. As one court observed, the right “has been infrequently examined; as a result its
contours remain less than clear.” Davis v. Bucher, 853 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1988). The
scope and existence of the constitutional right to information privacy remains in dispute
among lower courts. A majority of the circuit courts has accepted the constitutional right to
information privacy. See, e.g., In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999); Walls v.
City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990); Barry v. City of New York, 712
F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570,
577 (3d Cir. 1980); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978). One
circuit court has expressed “grave doubts” as to the existence of the right, stopping short of
confronting the issue of whether the right existed. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Dep’t
of Housing & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 788, 791-92 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The Sixth Circuit
recognizes the right, but only as a narrow corollary to the decisional privacy cases, pertaining to personal information relating to one’s health, family, children, and other interests
protected by the Court’s substantive due process right to privacy decisions. J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1089 (6th Cir. 1981). To date, only a handful of law review articles
and notes have discussed the constitutional right to information privacy in great depth.
See, e.g., Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerg-

2002]

ACCESS AND AGGREGATION

1199

ernment’s information handling obligations awaits further development.
It remains undetermined whether these obligations extend to measures
beyond non-disclosure, such as the security of information, limited use,
purpose specification, and other Fair Information Practices.
Nevertheless, taken together, the Court’s jurisprudence in the contexts of free association and the constitutional right to information privacy suggests that the Constitution does not merely mandate public access to information but also obligates the government to refrain from
disclosing personal information.
B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
The First Amendment more directly fosters information flow about
government activities by forbidding restrictions on freedom of speech
and the press. These freedoms extend beyond disclosure about government to almost all forms of discourse, including speech about private
citizens.
Understanding how use and access restrictions on public record information interact with the First Amendment requires a difficult navigation between two lines of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Under one line
of cases—Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn Publishing Co.,414 Oklahoma
Publishing Co. v. District Court In and For Oklahoma County,415 Smith
v. Daily Mail,416 and Florida Star v. B.J.F.417 —the Court has held that
when the government makes information publicly available in a public
record, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it.418 In Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Co.,419 however,
the Court concluded that the government may selectively grant access to
public record information.420 In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,421 the
Court stated that the government may condition the receipt of discovery
information on nondisclosure,422 a conclusion that is supported by the
Court’s extensive unconstitutional condition jurisprudence. I will attempt
to navigate these choppy waters of Supreme Court free speech jurispruing Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
479 (1990); Bruce W. Clark, Note, The Constitutional Right to Confidentiality, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 133 (1982); Gary R. Clouse, Comment, The Constitutional Right to Withhold Private Information, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 536 (1982).
414. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
415. 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam).
416. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
417. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
418. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 495; Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 538.
419. 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
420. Id. at 40-41.
421. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
422. Id. at 33-34.
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dence to assess how the Court would (and should) analyze the types of
use and access restrictions I suggested in Part II.
In a series of cases, the Court has struck down a number of statutes
prohibiting the disclosure of information gleaned from public records. In
Cox Broadcasting Corp.,423 the Court held that a state could not impose
civil liability based upon publication of a rape victim’s name obtained from
a court record.424 The Court pronounced that “[o]nce true information is
disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press
cannot be sanctioned for publishing it.”425 In justifying the rule, the
Court concluded that not only does the ability to report on the criminal
justice system provide greater transparency in government, but that the
fact that the information was in a public record reduced the plaintiff’s
privacy interest.426 “[T]he interests in privacy fade when the information
involved already appears on the public record.”427 Punishing the press
for publishing public record information would “invite timidity and selfcensorship and very likely lead to the suppression of many items that
would otherwise be published and that should be made available to the
public.”428 If states wish to protect privacy, they “must respond by
means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private
information.”429
After Cox Broadcasting Corp., in Oklahoma Publishing Co.,430 the
Supreme Court held that a state court could not prohibit the media from
disclosing the name and photograph of an eleven-year-old boy when the
media had gleaned that information by attending a juvenile proceeding.431 In Smith432 the Court struck down a statute prohibiting the publication of the names of juvenile offenders: “[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information,
absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.”433
This line of cases culminated in Florida Star,434 in which a newspaper published the name of a rape victim, which it obtained in a publicly

423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.

420 U.S. 469 (1975).
Id. at 496-97.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 494-95.
Id.
Id. at 496.
Id.
430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam).
Id. at 311-12.
443 U.S. 97 (1979).
Id. at 103.
491 U.S. 524 (1989).
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released police report. The report was in a room with signs indicating
that the names of rape victims were not part of the public record and
were not to be published.435 The reporter even admitted that she knew
she was not allowed to report on the information.436 The victim’s fellow
workers and friends read the article; her mother received threatening
phone calls from a man who stated he would rape the woman again; and
these events caused her to change her phone number and residence, seek
police protection, and obtain mental health counseling.437 Under a Florida law prohibiting the mass communication of the names of rape victims, the paper was found civilly liable.438 The Court, however, held that
the Florida law ran afoul of the First Amendment. “We hold only that
where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully
obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order . . . .”439
Taken together, these cases support the premise that once the government makes information public, the government cannot subsequently
sanction its further disclosure. In Cox, however, the Court noted that it
was not reaching “any constitutional questions which might arise from a
state policy not allowing access by the public and press to various kinds of
official records.”440
The Court addressed this issue in United Reporting Publishing
Corp.441 when it examined the constitutionality of California’s access
restriction law for arrestee information.442 The law required those seeking access to the information to execute a declaration under penalty of
perjury that address information “shall not be used directly or indirectly
to sell a product or service to any individual or group of individuals.”443
Rejecting a facial challenge that the law infringed upon commercial
speech, the Court reasoned that the statute was not “prohibiting a speaker
from conveying information that the speaker already possesses” but was
merely “a governmental denial of access to information in its possession”
under which it had no duty to disclose.444 As long as the government is
not under a duty to provide access to information, it can selectively de-

435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

Id. at 546 (White, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 541.
Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 496 n.26 (1975).
528 U.S. 32, 34 (1999).
Id. at 34.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(f)(3) (West Supp. 1999).
United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. at 40.
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termine who shall have access to it.445 The Court also held in Houchins v.
KQED Inc.446 that “[n]either the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth
Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or
sources of information within the government’s control.”447
In addition to the cases discussed above, the Supreme Court’s “unconstitutional condition” jurisprudence lends further support for the government’s ability to condition access to public records.448 A series of
cases establishes the limits of what access conditions are permissible.
According to the doctrine, originating during the Lochner era, “government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that
benefit altogether.”449 Kathleen Sullivan aptly characterizes the doctrine
as “riven with inconsistencies.”450
In several cases decided during the 1950s and 1960s, the Court invalidated several conditions requiring that recipients of the government’s
largesse surrender constitutional rights. In Speiser v. Randall,451 the
Court held that war vetarans could not be required to take a loyalty oath
in order to receive a property tax exemption because it “will have the ef445. In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, the Court held that a party obtaining access to
information via discovery could be restricted from disclosing that information through a
protective order. 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984). A newspaper challenged a protective order on
First Amendment grounds, but the Court upheld the order, noting that the broad discovery
rules permit parties to obtain information “that not only is irrelevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputation and privacy.” Id. at 35. Therefore, the Court held
that when a “protective order is entered on a showing of good cause as required by Rule
26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other sources, it does not offend the First
Amendment.” Id. at 37 (citation omitted).
446. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
447. Id. at 15. In a series of cases, the Court has held that outside of the First
Amendment right of access, freedom of the press does not require that the press be given
any special rights to acquire information from the government. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) (“The First Amendment generally grants
the press no right to information about a trial superior to that of the general public.); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (The Constitution does not . . . require government to
accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the public generall) (citation omitted); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (“The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”). Additionally, the
Court held that the First Amendment cannot foreclose a lawsuit by a confidential source to
enforce a newspaper’s promise of confidentiality because the press “has no special immunity from the application of general laws. . . . [and] no special privilege to invade the rights
and liberties of others.” Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (quoting
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-22 (1937)).
448. Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1418
(1989).
449. Id. at 1415.
450. Id. at 1416.
451. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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fect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech.”452
Sherbert v. Verner453 struck down the denial of state unemployment
benefits to a person who refused to work on Saturday for religious reasons because it “forces her to choose between following the precepts of
her religion and forfeiting benefits.”454 Furthermore, in Shapiro v.
Thompson,455 the Court held unconstitutional the denial of welfare benefits to people who had recently moved into a state because it chilled the
right to interstate travel.456
Cases decided after the mid-1970s, however, are very inconsistent.
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington,457 the Internal
Revenue Code provided a tax benefit to veterans’ lobbying groups but
not other charities.458 The Court applied minimal scrutiny because Congress was not required to provide any tax advantage for lobbying.459 The
government was simply selecting “particular entities or persons for entitlement.”460
A year later in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California,461 the
Court applied heightened scrutiny to strike down a condition that federally-funded broadcasting stations refrain from editorializing in order to
receive funding from the government.462 Similarly, in Arkansas Writers’
Project, Inc. v. Ragland,463 the Court struck down a state sales tax that
excluded certain types of magazines (religious, professional, trade, and
sports) but not others.464
Returning to its permissive view of conditional funding, the Court in
Lyng v. International Union465 upheld a statute making households ineligible for food stamps if any member of that household was on strike:
“[E]ven where the Constitution prohibits coercive governmental interference with specific individual rights, it does not confer an entitlement to
such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.”466 Likewise, the Court reasoned in Maher v. Roe467 that the gov452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.

Id. at 519.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Id. at 404.
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
See id. at 634.
461 U.S. 540 (1983).
Id. at 542.
See id. at 549-50.
Id. at 549.
468 U.S. 364 (1984).
Id. at 402.
481 U.S. 221 (1987).
Id. at 233.
485 U.S. 360 (1988).
Id. at 369 (internal quotations omitted).
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ernment can selectively provide funds for normal childbirth without having also to fund abortions.468
Today, the leading case on the subject is Rust v. Sullivan,469 in
which Congress prohibited workers in federally funded family planning
services from engaging in counseling advocating abortion as a method of
family planning.470 Rejecting a First Amendment challenge, the Court
concluded that
[t]he Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the
problem in another way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on
the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion
of the other . . . .471

As these cases indicate, the government retains significant discretion
in how it chooses to distribute its largesse. Public record information is
part of this largesse, and the most recently decided unconstitutional condition cases suggest that the government can impose certain conditions on
how this information is used before it grants access.
The Court’s jurisprudence thus creates a distinction between preaccess conditions on obtaining information and post-access restrictions on
the use or disclosure of the information. If the government is not obligated
to provide access to certain information by the First Amendment, it can
amend its sunshine laws to establish pre-access conditions, restricting access for certain kinds of uses. Governments can make a public record
available on the condition that certain information is not disclosed or used
in a certain manner. However, governments cannot establish post-access
restrictions on the disclosure or use of information that is publicly available.472 Once the information is made available to the public, the Florida
Star case prohibits a state from restricting use.473
One could certainly argue that the Court’s distinction between preaccess and post-access restrictions seems rather tenuous. States can accomplish the same restrictions on disclosure of public information that the
Court struck down in Florida Star with a simple redrafting of their statutes.
In Florida Star, Florida could have easily rewritten its law to make rape
victims’ names available on the condition that the press promise they not
467. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
468. Id. at 479.
469. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
470. Id. at 202-03.
471. Id. at 193.
472. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 523 U.S. 514 (2001).
473. 491 U.S. at 524 (1989); see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (holding that a state could not criminalize a newspaper’s disclosure of leaked information about a judicial disciplinary proceeding).
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be disclosed. Those seeking access could be required to sign a declaration
that the information would not be disclosed or used for certain purposes.
Conditional access and use restrictions thus appear to be an end-run around
Florida Star. Can the Court’s distinction between pre- and post-access restrictions be defended?
Certain language in Florida Star suggests that the case turns on the
government’s unclean hands, as the Court emphasizes the government’s
failure “to police itself in disseminating information.”474 “[W]here the
government has made certain information publicly available,” the Court
observed, “it is highly anomalous to sanction persons other than the
source of its release.”475 Acting hypocritically by disclosing information
and then punishing the press for the same offense, the state cannot give the
press the forbidden fruit and ask the press not to eat it. Moreover, the Florida statute had no scienter requirement; it imposed liability regardless of
whether the rape victim’s name was already known throughout the community.476
This distinction between post- versus pre-access conditions can be defended as a protection against the chilling effects caused by uncertainty
over the public record information that can be disclosed. According to Cox
Broadcasting Corp. and Florida Star, one should not have to act at her
peril whenever she discloses information obtained from a public record.
By making access conditional on a promise not to disclose or restricting
access in certain cases, however, there is a clear notice to the recipient as to
her obligations and responsibilities in handling that information.
Without a distinction between post- and pre-access conditions, the
government would be forced into an all-or-nothing tradeoff between transparency and privacy. The government could make records public, allowing all uses of the personal information contained therein, or the government could simply make records unavailable to the public for any purpose.
However, by making access conditional on accepting certain responsibilities when using data—such as using it for specific purposes, not disclosing
it to others, and so on, certain functions of transparency can be preserved at
the same time privacy is protected.
Has the Court too quickly dispatched with the free speech implications of conditional or limited access regulation? Do restrictions on
commercial access, for example, constitute unconstitutional contentbased restrictions on free speech because they single out specific messages and viewpoints—namely, commercial ones? Prior to United Re-

474. 491 U.S. at 538.
475. Id. at 535.
476. Id. at 539.
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porting Publishing, courts were divided on the issue.477 Although commercial speech was originally not considered to fall within the domain of
the First Amendment,478 in 1976, the Court recognized a limited First
Amendment protection for commercial speech.479 Typically, a contentbased restriction on regular speech is reviewed under strict scrutiny, the
most stringent form of constitutional scrutiny.480 Content-based restrictions on commercial speech, however, are reviewed under a form of intermediate scrutiny. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of N.Y.481 sets forth the current test for analyzing restrictions on commercial speech.482 Courts are to first examine whether
commercial speech is misleading or involves illegal activity; if so, it is
not protected.483 If, however, the speech is not illegal or deceptive, then
it is protected by intermediate scrutiny.484 The government interest must
be substantial; the regulation must directly advance the government interest; finally, the regulation must be appropriately tailored to advance
the government interest (i.e., be no more extensive than necessary).485
The issue, then, is whether access restrictions are subject to no First
Amendment protection (except where barred by the First Amendment
right to access) or whether they implicate speech and are subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson. Dissenting in United Reporting Publishing Corp., Justice Stevens argued that the California access
and use restriction improperly singled out “a narrow category of persons
477. Compare Amelkin v. McClure, 168 F.3d 893, 902 (6th Cir. 1999), vacated and
remanded by McClure v. Amelkin, 528 U.S. 1059 (striking down an access restriction
statute), and Speer v. Miller, 15 F.3d 1007 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that an access restriction statute implicated First Amendment), and Babkes v. Satz, 944 F. Supp. 909, 912-13
(S.D. Fla. 1996) (striking down an access restriction statute), with Lanphere & Urbaniak v.
Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding Colorado access restriction to
arrestee records), Fed. Election Comm’n v. Int’l Funding Inst., Inc., 969 F.2d 1110, 111718 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding the Federal Election Campaign Act’s making political
committee contributor lists available for public inspection with the limitation that any information copied may not be sold or used for the purpose of soliciting contributions or for
commercial purposes because there was no pre-existing right to have access to such lists),
and DeSalvo v. State, 624 So. 2d 897, 901 (La. 1993) (upholding access restriction statute), and Walker v. S. C. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 466 S.E.2d 346, 348 (S.C.
1995) (holding that vehicle report access restriction “regulates only access to information”).
478. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
479. See Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizen’s Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976).
480. See Daniel J. Solove, Note, Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act and Religion in the Prisons, 106 YALE L.J. 459, 461 (1996).
481. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
482. Id. at 574.
483. Id. at 563-64.
484. Id. at 564.
485. Id. at 565.
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solely because they intend to use the information for a constitutionally
protected purpose.”486
Stevens’s argument is rejected by the unconstitutional condition
cases (especially Rust), which suggest that many access restrictions will
not implicate speech. Rust and some of its predecessors have engendered
significant criticism, and in my opinion, rightly so. Although I believe
that a number of the unconstitutional conditions cases, including Rust,
were wrongly decided, many use and access restrictions on personal information in public records will still pass constitutional muster without
the aid of these cases.
Kathleen Sullivan has made one of the most persuasive attacks
against the unconstitutional condition cases. As she explains, the Court’s
approach is to look for when conditions coerce individuals to surrender
rights or whether such conditions are enacted out of subterfuge and manipulation.487 This approach, Sullivan argues, is too narrow and crabbed,
for unconstitutional conditions “can alter the balance of power between
government and rightholders” and can “skew the distribution of constitutional rights among rightholders because [the government] necessarily
discriminates facially between those who do and those who do not comply with the condition.”488 Accordingly, Sullivan suggests a broader
form of analysis for unconstitutional conditions, one that “would subject
to strict review any government benefit condition whose primary purpose
or effect is to pressure recipients to alter a choice about exercise of a preferred constitutional liberty in a direction favored by government.”489
Rust certainly lends support for the theory that government can
make access to personal information in public records conditional on
non-disclosure or on particular uses. Additionally, Rust supports selective access restrictions. Rust is a troubling case in my opinion, but I contend that the free speech argument against public record access restrictions fails without having to enlist the aid of cases like Rust. In Rust, the
government made funding conditional on the expression of a particular
viewpoint. This is troublesome, for it is a use of government power (albeit in the guise of a carrot rather than a stick) to restrict certain views.
In contrast, commercial access restrictions are not being applied because
of disagreement with the message that commercial users wish to send.
Nor do they favor a particular speaker or specific ideas. Although particular categories of use (i.e., commercial) are being singled out, avoiding
viewpoint discrimination does not entail avoiding all attempts to catego486. L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 45 (1999)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
487. See Sullivan, supra note 448, at 1413-21.
488. Id. at 1490.
489. Id. at 1499-1500.
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rize or limit uses of information. Indeed, the First Amendment constitutional regime depends upon categorizing speech. Obscene speech and
fighting words are not protected,490 false speech about public figures is
protected in a limited way,491 and commercial speech is protected by intermediate scrutiny. Although there is no bright line that distinguishes
when certain categories map onto particular viewpoints to such a degree
as to constitute discrimination based on viewpoint, the category of commercial speech is broad enough to encompass a multitude of viewpoints
and is a category that forms part of the architecture of the current constitutional regime.
Therefore, governments should be able to restrict access for certain
purposes or condition access on an enforceable promise not to engage in
certain uses of information. Although the Court has opened a wide door
to viewpoint discrimination in Rust, a more appropriate approach is to
curtail broad categories of uses (i.e., commercial, information brokering,
further disclosure, and so on) rather than narrow categories, which often
single out particular viewpoints. Thus, for example, governments should
not restrict access to public records to those who wish to use the information to advocate for certain causes rather than others. Nor could the government restrict access based on the particular beliefs or ideas of the person or entities seeking access to the information.
Even if Rust were wrongly decided, we are still not bound to a rigid
version of neutrality that forces the government into a total access versus
no access regime. The issue is whether the government is singling out
certain uses because of an intent to curtail particular ideas it dislikes. A
limitation on commercial use is broad enough to encompass a diverse
enough range of viewpoints, and the government is merely limiting uses
of information rather than the expression of particular ideas.492
490. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
491. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974); Curtis Publ’g
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 160-61 (1967); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 296
(1964).
492. Even if the Central Hudson test were to apply, there is a good argument that
commercial use restrictions would satisfy the test. It is true that before United Reporting,
a number of courts struck down access and use restrictions. However, they did so based
on their adherence to the secrecy paradigm. These courts often rejected the state’s asserted
privacy interest because other uses of information were permitted. See, e.g., United Reporting Publ’g Co. v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d L.
A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Co., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) (“The fact that journalists, academicians, curiosity seekers, and other noncommercial users may peruse and
report on arrestee records . . . belies the LAPD’s claim that the statute is actually intended
to protect the privacy interests of arrestees.”); Speer v. Miller, 15 F.3d 1007, 1011 (11th
Cir. 1994) (“We note that any privacy arguments the state asserts are disingenuous in light
of the fact that the statute carves out an exception for the media to place any information
they obtain on the front page of any newspaper in Georgia.”) (citation omitted); Babkes v.
Satz, 944 F. Supp. 909, 912 (S.D. Fla. 1996). According to this argument, if states really
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CONCLUSION: REGULATING PUBLIC RECORDS
Public records are increasingly posing a serious threat to privacy in
the Information Age. To understand this threat, our conceptions of privacy must be adapted to today’s technological realities. We must abandon the secrecy paradigm and recognize that what is public can be private—not in the sense that it is secret, but in that uses and disclosures of
information can be limited. Privacy is about degrees of accessibility.
The threat to privacy is not in isolated pieces of information, but in increased access and aggregation, the construction of digital biographies
and the uses to which they are put.
I advocate access and use restrictions on information as well as a
federal baseline of protection for all public records beyond the limited
scope of DPPA. The key issue is whether such a solution would be constitutional. As long as access and use restrictions are based on a conditional grant of access, they will pass constitutional muster. Further, the
Constitution establishes an obligation to protect against disclosure and
uses of information by the government. Today, government public record systems are not meeting this constitutional obligation. States must
begin to rethink their public record regimes, and the federal government
should step in to serve as the most efficient mechanism to achieve this
goal. It is time for the public records laws of this country to mature to
meet the problems of the Information Age.

want to protect privacy, they should also restrict the noncommercial uses of information,
such as publication of personal information by the media. This argument is also raised by
Justice Stevens in dissent in United Reporting: “By allowing such widespread access to the
information, the State has eviscerated any rational basis for believing that the [statute] will
truly protect the privacy of these persons.” United Reporting, 528 U.S. at 46 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). As I argued earlier, however, the fact that personal information is disclosed
selectively does not extinguish one’s privacy interest. It is the particular uses of information that pose some of the greatest problems for privacy. Even if the information is available for other purposes, there is an interest in limiting access and uses, especially commercial access given the escalating affront to privacy caused by private sector public record
aggregation and considering the fact that commercial users do not advance the purpose of
making such records public in the first place.

